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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
VON LESTER TAYLOR 
Petitioner/ Appellant, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent Appellee, 
Case No. 20040262 
JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (i) provides this Court's jurisdiction over appeals from 
district court cases involving a conviction of a capital felony 
ISSUES. PRESERVATION, AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Mr. Taylor is an inmate housed on Utah's death row. He pled guilty to two counts 
of capital homicide and was sentenced to death by a jury. His trial counsel was 
discharged. Substitute counsel was appointed and the case was remanded to the district 
court for consideration of ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court found that trial 
counsel was not ineffective, and the case was appealed to this Court. This Court upheld 
Mr. Taylor's conviction. State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681 (Utah 1997). 
Mr. Taylor filed a First Amended Petition pursuant to the Utah Post-Conviction 
Remedies Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-35a-101 to -202 raising twenty-five claims. The 
issues raised include: 
1. The plea and conviction were not made voluntarily, and that Mr. Taylor was not 
aware that dismissed counts would be used at the penalty phase. Claims I & II 
2. Mr. Taylor suffers from neuropsychiatry injury the was neither discovered nor 
presented at the penalty phase hearing. Additionally, prior counsel failed to 
present and discover additional important mitigation and exculpatory evidence. 
Claims III, IV, XVII. 
3. There was legal and constitutional error in certain instructions that were given 
and in the court's failure to give certain proposed instructions. Claims IV, V, VI, 
VII, VIII, IX, X, XI, XII, & XIII 
4. The voir dire was unconstitutionally limited and did not result in a fair and 
impartial jury. Claims XIV & XV. 
5. Several of jurors did not meet the constitutional standards of impartiality. 
Claim XVI. 
6. Trial and appellate counsel were ineffective. Claims XVIII & XIX. 
7. Utah's death penalty statute is unconstitutional. Claim XX. 
8. The trial court failed to take appropriate steps to ensure that Mr. Taylor was 
competent to proceed at both the penalty phase and during the rule 23B hearing. 
Claim XXI. 
9. The trial court erred in admitting the hearsay statement of a suspected co-
defendant at the penalty phase. Claim XXII. 
10. The prosecution committed misconduct by introducing prejudicial evidence at 
the penalty phase, by objecting to proper voir dire questions, and by making 
prejudicial arguments during the penalty phase. Claim XXIII. 
11. Trial counsel had a conflict of interest making the penalty phase 
fundamentally unfair. Claim XXIV. 
12. Utah's death penalty statute is unconstitutional. Claim XXV. 
When reviewing an appeal from an order regarding post-conviction relief, the 
appellate court reviews the habeas court's conclusion of law for correctness and its 
findings of fact for clear error. Julian v. State, 52 P.3d 1168 (Utah 2002). "Generally, an 
2 
appeal from a judgment on a petition for post-conviction relief raises questions of law 
reviewed for correctness, giving no deference to the post-conviction court's conclusion." 
Wickham v. Galetka, 61 P.3d 978, 979 (Utah 2002) 
All the issues were raised in writing in pleadings including the First Petition, the 
First Amended Petition, the Response to the Motion for Summary Judgment and in other 
pleadings. Post-Conviction Record, 1-20, 521-808, 1072-1167 (hereinafter "Post-
Conviction R"). Although the court granted summary judgment without a hearing, the 
court nonetheless heard oral argument on the issues raised in the petitions. Post-
Conviction Transcript, 1986 (p.p. 1-37), 1987 (p.p. 1- 66), 1988 (p.p. 1- 25) (hereinafter 
"Post-Conviction TR"). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The pertinent constitutional provisions, statutes and rules are in the addendum to 
this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE/FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A. Nature of Charges, Pretrial Motions 
Von Lester Taylor was originally charged along with co-defendant, Edward Deli, 
in a ten cpunt information with two counts of capital homicide, attempted criminal 
homicide, aggravated arson, two counts of aggravated kidnaping, aggravated robbery, 
theft, failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop, and aggravated assault. Trial 
Record, 002 (hereinafter "Trial R"). The incident giving rise to the charges occurred on 
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December 22, 1990. The facts underlying the case are more fully set forth by this court's 
decision in State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681 (Utah 1997). 
Mr. Taylor appeared before a state magistrate on December 24, 1990; Elliott 
Levine (hereinafter "Mr. Levine" or "trial counsel"), the Summit County Public 
Defender, was assigned to represent Mr. Taylor. Trial R, 1L The preliminary hearing 
was held for both defendants on January 8, 1991. Both Mr. Taylor and Mr. Deli were 
bound over for trial on all charges. Preliminary Hearing Transcript, 130-35 (hereinafter 
"PHTR"). On January 21, 1991, trial counsel filed a one page pleading styled Notice of 
Intent to Claim Defense of Insanity or Diminished Mental Capacity. Trial R, 29. Two 
alienists were appointed "to examine the Defendant and prepare a written report of 
findings on the condition of the defendant and address the issues of insanity and 
diminished mental capacity and release a copy of said findings to the Court, the 
Prosecutor, and Defendant's counsel within thirty days. . . ." Trial R, 32. 
Approximately two weeks later, trial counsel filed a one page motion to sever and 
a one page motion for change of venue. Trial R., 34 & 36. Trial counsel submitted no 
memoranda with any of the motions. Both motions were denied. Trial R, 64-67. On 
March 18, 2001, co-defendant Deli's attorney made application to the court for 
appointment of co-counsel and for leave to make ex parte application for expert and 
investigative services. Trial R, 68. Trial counsel for Mr. Taylor neither made application 
for co-counsel nor had he in any other case throughout his legal career. Rule 23B 
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Transcript, 1931 (hereinafter "Rule 23B TR"). 
On March 5, 1991, trial counsel moved for a continuance of the trial set for March 
19, 1991 indicating that he had not received the reports from the psychiatric evaluators. 
Trial R, 61. The trial was continued until May 7, 1991. Trial R, 75. Deli filed a 
discovery request seeking information and evidence that would be introduced at both the 
guilt and penalty phases. The state responded to Deli's discovery request. Trial R, 80. 
Mr. Levine filed no discovery request, but instead relied on "an open policy file (sic in 
original) with the County Attorney's Office." Rule 23B TR, 1871. 
Trial counsel's strategy, in lieu of filing pretrial motions, was to simply object if 
"he thought [the evidence] was too inflammatory or prejudicial...." Rule 23BTR, 1869. 
In fact, trial counsel had only filed pretrial motions in limine "maybe two times . . ." in his 
twenty year career as a defense lawyer. Rule 23BTR, 2094. His general philosophy 
regarding admissibility of evidence in capital cases was a strategy described as the "broad 
brush approach" meaning he assumed "everything was going to come in.. . ." Rule 23B 
TR, 1969. After hearing the evidence at trial, he might object if he thought "it was too 
inflammatory or prejudicial, [or] too graphic " Id. 1869. 
B. Change of Plea. Pretrial Investigation 
On May 1, 1991, Mr. Taylor pled guilty to two counts of capital murder. Trial R, 
105. The facts supporting this claim are found in the transcript of the plea colloquy 
conducted on May 1, 1991 and the Statement of Defendant plea form. The court 
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questioned whether the dismissed counts would be used as aggravating circumstances. 
Trial TR, 266-67. The state responded that the evidence of the other (dismissed) counts 
would be limited to their relationship to the murder. Id. The court then asked about 
whether the state intended to introduce the "crimes of arson, kidnaping and so forth." 
The prosecutor did not state that those crimes would be introduced as aggravating 
circumstances, but simply said "[t]here will be evidence of that(the other crimes)." Id. 
Mr. Levine was aware that some evidence would be introduced and would reserve any 
objections for the sentencing phase. Id. 
On May 8, 1991, one week after the change of plea, trial counsel made application 
to the court to hire "an investigative paralegal." Trial R., 120. She was not hired as an 
investigator, however, as her primary role was that of paralegal. Rule 23BTR, Vol. VII, 
1553. Her primary duties were to read and organize the file and to attend the trial of the 
co-defendant. Vol. VII, 1560-61. She also spoke with one witness, Joe Offret, a Summit 
County Police Officer, but prepared no reports regarding that interview. Id. 1554-55. 
The investigator had no training in either "capital cases," or application of "mitigation 
theories" in capital cases. Id. 1557. 
During the time period between January 1991 and May 1991, trial counsel testified 
that the spent between five to twenty-four hours per week working on Mr. Taylor's case. 
Rule 23BTR, 1816-20. He spent approximately twelve hours per week consulting with 
Mr. Taylor. Id. In his trial preparation, trial counsel neither consulted with nor talked to 
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ballistics experts, Rule 23BTR, 1924, experts who examine or assist in the examination 
of evidence, id., at 1925, or a penalty or mitigation phase expert. Id. at 1926. When 
pressed to explain his efforts to counter the state's forensic investigation, trial counsel 
thinks he may have consulted some named "Chuck" or Charles, but could neither recall 
"Chuck's" last name nor the subject matter discussed. Id. at 1925. 
As explanation for his failure to consult experts, trial counsel expressed a 
philosophical aversion to expert witnesses proclaiming that "we can hire an expert to say 
just about anything." Rule 23BTR, 1926. Moreover, Levine doesn't "go around talking 
to and hiring experts merely because they are going to align with [his] position." Rule 
23BTR, 1927. He expressed a general misunderstanding about the necessity of 
consulting experts, instead believing that all experts are "guns for hire," who will say 
anything to support the party paying them. Rule 23BTR, 1927. Mr. Levine explained his 
view that it is oftentimes "unethical" to pay an expert to back a defense theory. Id. 1927. 
As an example, he referred to something called the "his grandmother didn't bake him 
chocolate cookies" defense as a basis for not consulting experts in this case. Rule 
23BTR, 1927. 
"Back in 1990, [trial counsel] was not aware that there was any such thing as a 
mitigation expert." Rule23B TR, 1929. By 1995, he was aware of such people, but 
expressed reservations about use of such experts because "they have other agendas " 
Id. 1929. 
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Trial counsel obtained all his information relative to Von's background through 
Von and his father, Tom Taylor. Thomas Taylor testified that trial counsel never asked 
about other potential family witnesses. Rule 23BTR, 2449. Thomas Taylor also 
"traveled a lot," during Von's childhood and was unaware of several things that occurred 
during that time. Trial TR, 759. 
In the course of his investigation, trial counsel did not acquire school records, Rule 
23BTR, 1955, independent medical records other than those disclosed in prior 
presentence reports, and prior psychological reports, id, 1955, made no attempt to obtain 
social services records, id, 1957, made no independent attempts to obtain records from 
organizations that Von belonged to, id, 1958, made no attempt to obtain records of boy 
scouts, juvenile records, or other independent records, id, 1960, obtained no independent 
records from Summit County jail, id, 1960, made no attempt to find independent 
employment records, and interviewed no friends prior to the hearing. Id. 1962. 
Trial counsel never wrote out the questions he intended to ask Tom Taylor at the 
penalty, although he spoke with him on several occasions in preparation for his testimony. 
Rule 23bTR, 2057-58. Thomas Taylor testified that trial counsel spent approximately two 
minutes in witness preparation prior to the penalty phase. Rule 23BTR, 2449. 
When asked to explained who he had interviewed and when, trial counsel 
responded that most potential trial witness were interviewed, but he simply could not 
recall the dates or substance of any interviews. Id. 2052-55. When pressed to identify 
8 
witnesses interviewed before trial, he finally responded that "[he] talked to so many 
people at so many various points in time . . . , [that] [i]t is all basically a blur . . . , [and he 
doesn't] have any independent recollections." Id. 2055-56. 
At the time of Mr. Taylor's trial, Elliot Levine was the Summit County public 
defender. Rule 23BTR, 1780. The contract obligated Mr. Levine to represent all indigent 
persons charged with crimes except certain child sex or rape cases for he could not 
provide unbiased representation. Rule23BTR, 1780-81. Prior to the representation of 
Mr. Taylor, trial counsel handled one prior capital case, that of James Holland. Id. 1791.1 
1
 Mr. Holland's death sentence was eventually reversed by this Court, and Mr. 
Levine was removed from the case prior to the appeal. See State v. Holland, 876 P.2d 
357 (Utah 1994) Two members of this court sharply rebuked Mr. Levine for his 
representation of both Mr. Holland and Mr. Taylor: 
[We] believe that Levine's conduct as defense counsel requires further action by 
the court. Levine has demonstrated such a fundamental and underlying 
misconception of the defense attorney's role that the death penalty should be set 
aside and the matter remanded for a new penalty hearing. 
Holland, 876?.2d at 361. 
In expressing concern about Mr. Levine's performance in Mr. Taylor's case 
Justices Stewart and Durham commented that: 
Levinefs view of his role as a defense attorney is inconsistent with the duties 
the law imposes on defense counsel. It is not the role of defense counsel to 
persuade a defendant to plead guilty because counsel concludes that the defendant 
committed a crime. Defense counsel's obligation is to explain the evidence against 
the defendant, the nature of all defenses that might be provable, all the various 
options the defendant has in pleading guilty or not guilty and going to trial, and the 
possible or likely consequences of those options. It is not defense counsel's 
responsibility or proper role to decide that a defendant deserves the death penalty. 
Should a defendant choose to contest the charges against him or her, it is counsel's 
9 
When asked about the number of cases Mr. Levine had taken to trial, he responded: 
I don't keep scorecards. I do a job. I do what needed (sic) to be done. I did it that 
time. And I don't keep scorecards of wins, losses, trials, settlements. I do a job. 
Rule 23BTR, 1792. 
In preparation for handling death cases, trial counsel testified that he "consulted a 
death penalty manual that [he] thought was published by the American Bar Association," 
Rule 23BTR, 2279, and "always scan[ned] the [legal] resources available about possible 
new issues coming up." Id. 2280. 
C. Psychological Investigation Suicide Attempts/Competency Issues 
Mr. Levine's only arguable documented investigation consisted of filing a Notice 
of Intent to Assert an Insanity Defense. Trial counsel explained that he typically filed 
such motions in capital cases to obtain a "psychological profile" - "to find out if there's 
obligation to require the State to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Certainly attorneys are bound to have private feelings about the clients they 
represent and their guilt or innocence, but it is their professional responsibility to 
set aside private feelings and judgments and vigorously argue the law and the facts 
in a light as favorable to the defendant as the law and facts permit. That, however, 
is not the role Levine assumes when he acts pursuant to his stated philosophy. 
Under that philosophy, defense counsel acts as an agent for the prosecution in 
ensuring that defendants take responsibility for their crimes (as Levine would 
adjudge the matter) and that punishment, as deemed appropriate by counsel, is 
meted out. As Levine stated it, it is his duty "to get that person [i.e., the defendant] 
to come forth [and] admit their wrong doing." The practical effect of that 
philosophy is to nullify our adversarial system and to deny the defendant the 
effective assistance of counsel. 
Holland, 876 P.2d at 362-63. 
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something going on psychologically that you can pursue " Rule 23BTR, 2248. 
Dr. Rindflesh "evaluated" Mr. Taylor in one day, on February 22, 1991. Post-
Conviction R. 693. He "evaluated Mr. Taylor for one and one-half hours, reviewed 
records for forty-five minutes prior to the interview and spent forty-five minutes writing a 
report. Id. at 696. Dr. Rindflesh does not specify the documents reviewed prior to the 
evaluation, but states that he "reviewed various documents relating to the alleged crime, 
including police reports, interviews and autopsy reports," which were given to him by the 
county attorney. Id. at 693. He conducted something called "an informal mental status 
examination," although he failed to identify what this informal test measured or how it 
was administered. Id. Dr. Rindflesh apparently neither reviewed nor attempted to 
determine if any other mental health records existed. Instead, he simply concluded that 
"[Mr. Taylor] has no history of involvement with counseling or therapy from mental 
health professionals for drug or alcohol abuse, or any other psychiatric problem." He 
reiterated that Mr. Taylor does not suffer from a mental illness "because he has no history 
of mental illness. . . ." 
Dr. Rindflesh neither spoke to nor attempted to contact Mr. Levine or anyone in 
Mr. Taylor's family. He based at least part of his conclusion on Mr. Taylor's word that 
he "himself, reported no symptoms of any psychiatric illness." Id. at 694. Although he 
knew that Mr. Taylor "was sent to the Utah State Prison in late 1989 . . . ," and was 
housed in Orange Street, a state half-way house facility which treats mentally ill 
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offenders, he neither requested nor reviewed any records from those facilities. He not 
only failed to review the ninety day evaluative reports, presentence reports, and other data 
generated by the department of corrections, he apparently was unaware such reports 
existed since there is no reference to that information in Rindflesh's evaluation. 
On February 11, 1991, Dr. Moench examined Mr. Taylor for three hours at the 
Summit County Jail "for the purpose of determining his state of mind at the time of the 
alleged commission of crimes with which he is charged as it relates to the defense of 
insanity." It appears that Dr. Moench reviewed police reports, other investigative 
reports, and transcripts of interviews with victims. Moreover, Dr. Moench reviewed the 
1989 St. George presentence burglary report, and a ninety day diagnostic evaluation 
prepared by diagnostic investigator Robyn Williams, which included a psychological 
evaluation by L. Donald Long, Ph.D. 
Dr. Moench noted a past psychiatric history, past psychological testing, and past 
medical problems, and apparently conducted some memory and cognitive testing, 
although neither the tests nor methodology are identified. Dr. Moench was apparently 
aware of at least some of Mr. Taylor's prior mental health history citing prior suicide 
ideation, serious mood swings, and referral for mental health treatment at the Iron County 
Jail. Dr. Moench noted that "psychological testing . . . revealed [Taylor] to be extremely 
paranoid and borderline schizophrenic or depressed and suicidal." 
Dr. Moench concluded that "[t]he random property destruction in the cabins 
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around Oakley, and the destruction of human life itself, is a level of violence sometimes 
seen with head injured or otherwise brain damaged people." Post-Conviction R. 708. Dr. 
Moench dismissed this conclusion, however, noting that Mr. Taylor "presents no history 
of head injury and no evidence for brain impairment other than some degree of learning 
disability in math and English." Id. Dr. Moench conducted no neuropsychiatry testing to 
determine the presence of brain damage. 
Dr. Moench observed that in 1989, Dr. Kliarsky of Southwest Mental Health 
found Taylor "to be extremely paranoid and borderline schizophrenic or depressed and 
suicidal." Neither Dr. Moench nor attorneys Levine and Savage requested nor reviewed 
records from Dr. Kliarsky or Southwest Mental Health. He also noted that, Dr. Long, as 
part of the ninety day evaluation, diagnosed Mr. Taylor with "Adjustment Disorder with 
Mixed Emotional Features and elements of Passive Aggressive Personality Disorder." 
None of the test data was reviewed or requested by Dr. Moench, Levine or Savage. Dr. 
Moench diagnosed Mr. Taylor with "Antisocial Personality Disorder with Schizoid 
Personality Disorder,"2 but notes both a learning disability and social withdrawal in 
school. Post-Conviction R. at 707. 
Levine relied upon the representation in the Rindflesh report indicating that Mr. 
2
 "The essential feature of Schizoid Personality Disorder is a pervasive pattern of 
detachment from social relationships and a restricted range of expression of emotions in 
interpersonal settings." Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV, 638. 
Persons who meet this diagnostic criteria lack a desire for intimacy, avoid close 
relationships, and are generally detached from family and other social groups. Id. 
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Taylor had no prior history of mental health, psychiatric or alcohol/ substance abuse 
problems, as a basis to conduct no further investigation. Trial R.2251. He also felt that 
Moench report was very damning and gave him no options to investigate further 
psychological claims. Vol. Ill, 92, R.2265. Although he claims to have reviewed the 
information in the prior presentence report, and items he identified as "prior 
psychological reports . . . [with] medical histories... [he] didn't see anything in that that 
glared out at [him] requiring any further delving into [Mr. Taylor's] medical records." 
Rule 23BTR, 1955. 
/. Mental Health Issues at Penalty Phase and Rule 23B Hearing 
On the opening morning of the penalty phase, Mr. Taylor attempted suicide by 
slitting his wrists. These injuries required medical treatment and stitches. Trial TR, 30. 
The trial was delayed as the parties expressed concerned about Mr. Taylor's competency 
to proceed. The court contacted Dr. Mark Rindflesh, the Salt Lake City psychiatrist, who 
earlier filed a report stating that Mr. Taylor had no history of counseling or therapy from 
mental health professionals, "no history of mental illness," and no "psychiatric problems." 
The parties questioned "whether or not Mr. Taylor [was] competent to proceed 
with the penalty phase of this trial." Trial R. 28-35 Dr. Rindflesh spoke briefly with Mr. 
Taylor, concluding he was competent to proceed. Id, There is no indication that he 
conducted any psychological or psychiatric tests and he prepared no reports. Dr. 
Rindflesh felt that Mr. Taylor suffered from depression, that could possibly be treated 
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with medication. Trial TR. 31. Despite finding Mr. Taylor competent, the doctor 
nonetheless expressed concern about giving Mr. Taylor anti-depressant medication 
because of a fear that he might save it for a future suicide attempt. Trial TR, 31-32. 
At the Rule 23B hearing, appellate counsel again expressed concern about Mr. 
Taylor's competency. He described Von as "either in some sort or depression or remorse 
or something. His eyes are teary, he's crying and he is - although he's responsive to my 
questions in the sense of being oriented as to time and space, he is answering questions by 
telling me about personal feelings instead of being responsive to the questions that I'm 
asking." Rule 23B, 2178. These observations were confirmed by appellate counsel's 
assistant. Id. Mr. Taylor responded to questions: "I'm too depressed. I'm too depressed. 
I can't do this anymore." Id. Appellate counsel further indicated that Mr. Taylor's 
conduct is "totally and completely . . . [a] surprise." Rule 23B TR, 2182, Appellate 
counsel expressed grave concerns about his competency to proceed further in the hearing: 
If Mr. Taylor is emotionally of the state that it is certainly that I'm observing -
again, I am not holding myself out as any kind of an expert here - but if his 
emotional depression is such that he, after all of this, is willing to risk the motion 
of the state to pull this entire thing back, I want him examined by somebody. 
Rule 23B, 2186. 
During the same conversation, Mr. Taylor seems confused about his options 
regarding the Rule 23B hearing and the appeal: 
Q: [Mr.Voros]: Does he understand that he has an appeal even if he doesn't have 
his 23(b)? 
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A: [Mr. Savage]: I don't know what he understands. That's why I said: "Do I ask 
him" - is what you are telling me, you want to back out, not do this and just have 
me do things at the Supreme Court, "yes" or "no?" The answer I got, however was 
not "yes" or "no"; and so as I've indicated, I didn't feel like I could proceed in any 
direction. Rule 23B TR,2190 
At one point during the colloquy, Mr. Taylor did not respond to the Judge's 
question and instead turned toward appellate counsel. Rule 23B TR, 2203-04. Appellate 
counsel unequivocally moved to have Mr. Taylor evaluated for competency. Rule 23B, 
Vol.III, 2218-20. The court denied the motion finding that a Rule 23B hearing was not a 
proceeding contemplated by §77-15-5 and that defendant did not have a right to raise a 
competency claim under that provision: 
[T]he Court's of the opinion that the applicable law does not require the Court to 
stay the proceedings and interrupt the proceedings for inquiry into his competency 
and therefore will deny the motion. 
Rule 23BTR, 2223-25. 
D. Penalty Phase Case 
1. Voir Dire, Jury Selection 
After the plea on May 1, 1991, the case proceeded to a penalty phase hearing 
beginning on May 8, 1991. Trial counsel submitted no proposed voir dire questions and 
no pre-penalty phase motions. 
Ninety seven jurors were summoned for the jury pool. Trial R. 125-30. The court 
conducted voir dire with the large group. Trial Tr. 33-133. The court began by asking the 
jurors if they knew any of the parties or witnesses. Id. at 41-74. The court then asked the 
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pool if they met the legal requirements for jury service. Id. at 74. The court next had 
each juror stand, state their name, occupation, name and occupation of spouse, level of 
education, and membership in social or service clubs. Id. at 77-97. The court asked about 
prior jury service, id, at 97, relatives or close friends who work in law enforcement, id, 
atl05, whether they would give more or less weight to law enforcement officers, id, at 
110-11, friends or family members involved in the criminal justice system, id, at 111-12, 
whether the jurors could follow the law, id, at 115, whether any of the jurors have been 
the victims of a serious crime, 115, whether anyone felt resentment toward the legal 
system, id, at 123, whether anyone had physical problems or mental disabilities 
preventing them from sitting as a juror, id, 124, and whether anyone would suffer any 
hardship by sitting on the jury. Id. 126. 
The in-chambers voir dire generally consisted of leading questions. Few jurors 
were asked about what they heard about the case. Rather most jurors were asked if they 
could set aside anything they might know about the case and judge the case on the facts 
presented in court. 
During the voir dire of potential jurors, trial counsel attempted to ask the following 
question: "Do you have any opinions as to - or any feelings that you would like to share 
with us as to whether or not you feel at this point, anyway, that a death penalty is more 
severe than life in prison or whether life in prison is more of a severe penalty." Trial TR. 
153. The state's attorney objected on relevance grounds. The court modified the 
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question to: "Do you think that the (sic) life imprisonment is a severe penalty?" Later, in 
voir dire, when Levine asked the same question, the court this time sustained the 
objection and disallowed questions comparing a life sentence to the death penalty. Trial 
TR. 179. 
During the in-chambers voir dire, the court singled out members of the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints concerning their knowledge of the doctrine of blood 
atonement. Those of LDS faith were asked if they heard or knew about the term, "blood 
atonement." Regardless of their answers, the court uniformly told them that "the [LDS] 
church does not accept the doctrine of blood atonement,"3 even when they expressed 
3
 (Juror Oldham) Vol. II, TR. 150; (Juror Jerry Lewis, "Are you aware that the 
LDS Church does not accept the doctrine of blood atonement." Vol. II, TR, 157); (Juror 
Robert Lewis, "Are you aware that the LDS Church does not accept the doctrine of blood 
atonement." Vol. II, TR. 170); (Juror Joseph Jenkins, "You're not aware that [the doctrine 
of blood atonement] is an accepted doctrine of the [LDS] Church." Vol. II, TR. 178); 
Juror Rowser, "So you're aware then that [the doctrine of blood atonement] is not an 
accepted doctrine of the [LDS] Church."); (Juror Schumann, "Are you aware that the 
LDS Church does not accept the doctrine of blood atonement?" Vol. II, TR. 206-07); 
(Juror Blaine Moore, "Are you aware that the [LDS] Church does not accept the doctrine 
of blood atonement." Vol. II, TR. 250); (Juror Ronald Wilde, "[The LDS Church] do[es] 
not teach [the doctrine of blood atonement], do you understand that; they do not teach that 
doctrine " Vol. II, TR, 270); (Juror Lesa Bird, "Are you aware that the [LDS] Church 
does not teach or accept the doctrine of blood atonement?" Vol. II, TR. 282); (Juror 
Gloria Mitchell, "Are you aware that the [LDS] Church does not teach the doctrine of 
blood atonement?" Vol. II, TR. 293); (Juror Lorene McNeil, Are you aware that the LDS 
Church does not accept the doctrine of blood atonement?" Vol. II, TR. 303, 304) (Juror 
J.L. Turner "Are you aware that the LDS Church does not accept the doctrine of blood 
atonement." Vol. II, TR, 314); (Juror Arnold Bosworth, "Are you aware that the LDS 
Church does not accept [the] doctrine [of blood atonement]." Vol. II, TR. 360); (Juror Jay 
Hendrickson, "Are you aware that the LDS Church does not accept [the] doctrine [of 
blood atonement]." Vol. II, TR. 369); (Juror David Richards, "Are you aware then that 
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belief in the doctrine. 
The court told every LDS jurors that the "Church" rejects the doctrine. There were 
no similar proclamations made to Catholics, Methodists or other religious groups 
explaining their official church position. Rather, the court simply asked non-LDS jurors 
their church's position regarding the death penalty, without telling them their church's 
position. 
2. Witherspoon Excludables, Challenges for Cause, Biased Jurors 
Juror Blaine Moore, who sat on the jury returning a verdict of death, stated his 
belief in the doctrine of blood atonement, agreeing that "anyone who kills must also be 
killed." Trial TR, 250. He expressed this view despite two admonitions from the court 
telling him that the "[LDS] Church does not accept the doctrine of blood atonement," id. 
250, and later asking if he "understand[s] that the [LDS] Church does not teach [the 
doctrine of blood atonement]." Id. Moreover, he expressed frustration at housing 
"guilty" people in jail at taxpayer expense, id. 251, and doesn't "think that's right." 
When asked if he was more inclined to impose the death penalty because Mr. Taylor 
"admitted to killing two individuals with a gun in an unprovoked manner," he responded: 
Well I've been considering that. Like I told the judge. I don't like to see anybody 
die. But nevertheless where he's committed a crime and by death, and did it 
the LDS Church dose not accept that doctrine." Vol. II, TR, 374); (Cheryl Chamberlain, 
"Are you aware that's not an accepted doctrine of the church." Vol. II, TR. 416); (Juror 
Reich, "And are you aware that the LDS Church does not teach that doctrine?" Vol. II, 
TR,421). 
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through thinking about it, then I've got a question about it. 
Trial TR. 253. Juror Moore also worked with prosecutor Adkins' mother at the LDS 
Temple. Id. at 253-54. 
Trial counsel moved to challenge Moore for cause "based upon his answers." Id. 
254. Levine noted that Moore believed in the doctrine of blood atonement and that based 
upon the general tenor and demeanor of his answers could not be a "fair and impartial 
juror." Id. The court denied the challenge. Id. 254. Interestingly, the prosecutor noted 
that Mr. Moore probably misunderstood the doctrine of blood atonement noting that "it 
was clear that he was thinking of something other than what those of us in the room now 
understand the doctrine of blood atonement to be." Id. 255. Mr. Moore sat on the jury 
that returned a verdict of death. 
During the course of voir dire, juror David Richards, who ultimately sat on the 
jury, indicated that he had an attorney client relationship with County Attorney, Bob 
Adkins. Vol. II, TR, 59.4 Juror Richards indicated that "Mr. Adkins office did a land 
contract for us about-," before he was interrupted by the court. Id. There were no follow 
up questions regarding the extent of the attorney/client relationship, the duration of that 
relationship, or whether that relationship still existed at the time of trial. The court simply 
asked whether juror Richards could still be "fair and impartial" despite that relationship. 
4
 The prosecution struck potential juror Philip Ovard who was a party opponent of 
Mr. Adkins in an earlier property transaction. Vol. II, TR. 290, R. 126. 
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Trial counsel neither asked follow-up questions nor moved to challenge juror Richards 
for cause. Mr. Richards sat on the jury that returned a verdict of death. 
In May, 1991, Juror Joseph Jenkins was the director of the Summit County Health 
Department. He was a "lifelong friend" of prosecutor Bob Adkins, and worked with 
prosecutors Adkins and Christiansen in the county office building. Trial TR. 44. The 
county attorney's office was the legal representative for the health department, as 
acknowledged by Mr. Jenkins who said he regularly consulted both Mr. Adkins and Mr. 
Christiansen "on ordinances." Id. at 44. Despite this apparent attorney/client 
relationship, neither the court nor Levine asked any follow up questions or sought to 
probe the extent of that relationship. Mr. Jenkins sat on the jury that returned a death 
sentence in this case. 
During voir dire, juror Cheryl Chamberlain disclosed that she was a cousin to 
Judge Edward Watson, who heard the preliminary hearing, and that her son was married 
to prosecutor Bob Adkins' sister. Vol. II, TR. 113. Despite her disclosure of these 
relationships, no one asked her to further elaborate, especially the relationship between 
her and Mr. Adkins. No challenge for cause was made to remove Ms. Chamberlain. Ms. 
Chamberlain sat on the jury that returned a verdict of death. 
Juror Wilde expressed a belief that "anyone who kills must also be killed," Vol. II, 
TR, 250, and "if somebody kills somebody should pay for their life . . . , " Vol. II, TR, 
270, despite the court's repeated admonition that the LDS Church does not teach that 
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doctrine. Mr. Wilde asserted his belief that the death penalty was appropriate in this case. 
Id. 272. Trial counsel did not challenge juror Wilde for cause, but used a peremptory 
challenge to strike him. 
Potential juror McNeil witnessed the police chase in this case, Trial TR, 305, 
which was ultimately presented and argued as an aggravating circumstance. She 
expressed concern about her ability to be impartial based upon her observations. Id. The 
court, incorrectly, told her that because Mr. Taylor pled guilty she would "not be asked to 
judge whether or not it happened."5 Id. Moreover, because she observed the car chase 
and lived close to the Tiede cabin, Ms. McNeil told the court she was "fairly biased," 
against Mr. Taylor, id. 306, and did not think "that life in prison would be as severe a 
sentence as the death penalty." Id. 308. Trial counsel moved to strike Ms. McNeil for 
cause. Id. 310. The judge denied the challenge id. 311; trial counsel struck Ms. McNeil 
with the use of a peremptory challenge. R. 126. 
During voir dire, potential juror Dearl Shill stated that he didn't think that life in 
prison was a severe sentence. Vol. II, TR. 354. When trial counsel attempted a follow up 
question-whether Mr. Shill feels that life in prison is an appropriate penalty based on Mr. 
Taylor's admission of guilt- the court interceded stating, "I won't let you ask that that 
way." Id. Later, trial counsel moved to strike Shill for cause, a challenge which was 
denied. Vol. II, TR. 356-57. Trial counsel later used a peremptory challenge to strike 
5
 The fleeing charge was submitted as an aggravating circumstance. Trial R, 227. 
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juror Shill. R. 126. 
Juror Blum told the court that a lack of mental health or psychiatric evidence 
would have " substantial bearing on [her] decision . . . " to impose death. Vol. II, TR. 
321-22. In fact, she acknowledge that the lack of mental health evidence would "sway" 
her more toward the death penalty. Id. Despite these answers, trial counsel did not move 
to strike her for cause. Ms. Blum was removed from the jury by the prosecutor's use of a 
peremptory challenge. R. 127. 
Alternate juror Dennis Gunn knew prosecutor Adkins from "being a lifelong 
resident" of the county. Vol.. II, TR. 64. Moreover, Gunn acknowledged that he had a 
previous attorney/client relationship with Mr. Adkins, occurring two years before this 
case. Id. No one asked Mr. Gunn about the basis of that representation. 
3. Manley Evidence 
During the penalty phase, the prosecution called a witness named Scott Manley. 
Trial TR. 640-58. In December 1990, Manley lived at Freemont Community Correctional 
Facility, a Department of Corrections halfway house located in Salt Lake City. Id. 641. 
Manley was a friend of Von Taylor. Manley was contacted by police on December 26, 
1990 about information he may have had regarding the homicides at the Tiede cabin. 
When police went to his room, Manley "was observed with his pants down looking at 
pornographic material spread out in his room and masturbating." Post-Conviction R, 
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1646. Although he agreed to speak to police, he nonetheless "wonder[ed] if he would be 
in trouble for what his friend, Von Taylor, had done over the weekend." Id. When 
Manley spoke with police, he was unclear about the date he received the phone call, and 
thought the call might have been in the afternoon of December 22, 1990. Mr. Taylor 
purportedly told Manley about escaping from Orange Street Correctional Facility, with a 
friend, and how the two were going to New York. 
The telephone call was made from the Tiede cabin. Manley told the police that he 
believed the Tiede's were home when Mr. Taylor made the call, Post-Conviction R. at 
776, then he said that the call was made "after" the people were killed. Id. at 783. He at 
times said that Mr. Taylor "was going to waste the people," id. 776, but later said that the 
people might already be dead. Id. 783. Manley conceded that before the interview that he 
followed the case closely on the news as he knew about facts involving the case and 
condition of victims. Id. 
When Manley was called as a witness, he first refused to testify, claiming a fifth 
amendment privilege. Trial TR. 641. The court dismissed the jury, while the prosecutor 
gave Manley a grant of immunity. Id. 642. The jury apparently was not informed of this 
grant of immunity. In the meantime, while the jury was absent, Levine objected to the 
6
 The state moved to strike the records pertaining to inmate Manley; the court 
granted the motion to strike. As addressed below, petitioner contends that the trial court 
erred in striking that part of the record. 
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introduction of the tape-recorded interview7 and the transcript. Id. Levine first asked the 
court to review the tape in chambers, then objected on the ground that the witness was 
unavailable, argued that the capital sentencing statute, section 76-3-207, prohibited the 
introduction of such evidence, and that the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighed 
its probative value. Id. 647-48. 
The jury was brought back and Manley was again questioned: 
By Mr. Adkins: 
Q. Mr. Manley, on December 22nd, 1990 you did receive a telephone call from the 
defendant, Von Lester Taylor, at the Freemont Center; did you not? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. And during that telephone conversation did the defendant tell you where he 
was? 
A. No, plead the fifth. 
Q. During that telephone conversation did the defendant, Von Lester Taylor, tell 
you what he intended to do? 
A. No. 
Q: And during that telephone conversation did the defendant-
THE COURT: Your answer is no, Mr. Manley? 
THE WITNESS: Yeah. 
Q. (By Mr. Adkins) He didn 7 tell you what he intended to do later that day? 
7
 Mr. Levine had not listened to the tape-recorded interview prior to the penalty 
phase hearing. 
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A: No. 
Trial TR. 656-57(emphasis added). 
Manley refused to answer any other questions. The court nonetheless admitted the 
tape into evidence. 
Trial counsel objected to the introduction of the tape citing the Sixth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution, art I, § 12 of the Utah Constitution and Rule 804 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence and Utah Code Ann. §76-3-207. Trial Tr, 653. Rule23B 
counsel neither raised nor addressed the issue on appeal and the supreme court did not 
consider the matter under a plain error analysis. 
4. Ballistics, Less Culpable Defendant 
Linae Tiede, who entered the cabin with her mother and grandmother, was 
interviewed by police on December 22, 1990, the day of the incident, at 5:20 p.m.. She 
told Detective Rob Berry of the Summit County Sheriffs Office that Edward Deli 
appeared to be in charge: 
Det. Berry: Okay, did Von seem to be in control of everything, was he bossing 
Dave around most or were they both(sic) 
Linae Tiede: No, Dave was the bossiest one, but Von was like the one that did 
everything. Like, he shot(sic). 
Von's brother confirmed the leadership role played by co-defendant, Deli. Post-
Conviction R. 1405. Two days before the homicides, Steven recalled that "Deli was 
running the whole thing," that he was making plans for where the two would go, and how 
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they would get there. Mr. Taylor merely listened and went along. Id. 
Linae Tiede, observed the shooting from five feet away. She said that Mr. Taylor 
carried the .38 caliber, Edward Deli carried the .44. Post-Conviction R. 759. She 
believes that Edward Deli fired shots from the .44 while Von Taylor fired shots from the 
.38. Id. The projectiles recovered from the scene and analyzed by the Utah State Crime 
Laboratory show that the more serious injuries, and likely the fatal injuries, were caused 
by the .44 caliber weapon carried by Mr. Deli. See Trial Exhibits Numbers 28 to 38 
(showing that six .44 mag. bullets were recovered either from the bodies Kaye Tiede and 
Beth Potts or floor area under bodies, while only two .38 caliber bullets recovered with 
only one appearing to have hit Ms. Potts or Ms. Tiede). It appears from the crime lab 
report that Mr. Deli inflicted all three gunshot injuries on Mrs. Potts. See Autopsy Report 
and Bullet Analysis Summary compiled by Detective Joseph Offret on 2/28/91. (In his 
report, Offret concludes that the three projectile injuries or gunshot wounds to Mrs. Potts 
were inflicted by the .44 caliber weapon, the gun carried and discharged by Mr. Deli. A 
copy of that report is attached as Exhibit 19 to the First Amended Petition). See also 
Testimony of James Bell Trial TR. 5 52-73. Although the crime lab and Detective Offrett 
conclude that one of the bullets fired from .38 caliber struck Mrs. Tiede, it appears that 
neither trial counsel nor Rule 23B counsel conducted any independent investigation to 
determine the accuracy of this conclusion or to investigate whether the wound was fatal. 
5. James Holland Testimony, Comparing Mr. Taylor to Serial Killers, Possibility of 
Escape, Jury Instructions, Improper Argument 
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Trial counsel called James Holland, another one of his death row clients as a 
witness at the penalty phase. Mr. Levine had hoped to have Holland state that he was a 
prime candidate for the death penalty, while someone like Mr. Taylor was not. The court 
did not permit Holland to make the comparative analysis. Instead, Holland testified about 
his two convictions for murder, TR. 751, spending 40 of his 51 years in prison, TR. 750, 
and offered no expression of remorse for his murderous actions. TR. 754. Levine never 
explained how this was helpful to Mr. Taylor. Holland told the jury that prison was a 
place that bred violence and that prisoners must "react with violence." TR. 754. If 
Levine had any thought of arguing for rehabilitation or mercy for Mr. Taylor, Holland 
extinguished it: 
[M]ost prisons all they do is just breed hate with hate and resentment. That's just 
pounded into you. There's no form of rehabilitation. 
TR, 755. 
Holland also seriously hampered the argument for life by telling the jury that there 
was little hope in prison, that he was "never getting out so [he] might as well die," and 
"[i]f they sentence [him] to die all [he] say[s] is, 'come on, I'm not fighting you.'" This 
testimony was effectively used by the state to argue for death.8 Holland knew nothing of 
8
 Indeed, the prosecution seized upon this theme during closing: 
So you're going to put him in that prison and he's going to be part of it. I would 
submit he doesn't need to be part of it. 
TR. 855. 
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this case and said nothing positive about Mr. Taylor. Instead, Holland created the 
impression that prison would only make Mr. Taylor more violent, fill him with "hate and 
resentment/' and offer "no form of rehabilitation;' all of which made the jury's vote for 
death easier. 
During the penalty phase, the prosecution called Medical Examiner Investigator 
James Bell. Trial TR. 550. Bell conducted a portion of the investigation and gathered 
some of the evidence. Id. 552-73. In May, 1991, Bell had accepted a job with the FBI 
"investigating multiple murders and deaths." Id. 552. Near the end of the direct 
examination the prosecution asked Bell to rate this homicide using a one to ten 
"grossness" scale: 
Q. [by the prosecutor]: You've indicated that you've basically done hundreds of 
these crime scene investigations involving shootings. Mr. Levine has indicated that 
all shootings are gross. On a scale of one to 10, could you characterize how gross 
this shooting was? 
A. Probably a nine. 
Q. Why do you say that? 
A. Because it's a stranger-to-stranger murder, face-to-face shooting, and the 
victim sees it coming all the time. 
Vol. Ill, TR, 574. 
The prosecutor used this evidence forcefully and repeatedly during closing. In 
asking the jury to impose the death penalty, he repeated Jim Bell's assessment that this 
murder is a nine on a scale often, Trial TR, 835, promoted Bell's credentials as serial 
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killer investigator in asking the jury to evaluate or compare the "grossness" of Mr. 
Taylor's conduct, id, 834, and emphasized that Mr. Taylor should receive the death 
penalty because of Bells' belief that this was a "coldblooded (sic) execution murder." Id. 
During closing argument, the state also argued that a death sentence was the only 
appropriate option because Mr. Taylor might escape from prison. Id. 855. There was no 
evidence presented at the penalty phase hearing that Mr. Taylor had escaped from prison, 
that he attempted escape from prison, or that he be would housed in a section of the 
prison where escape was likely. The prosecution also suggested that because Mr. Taylor 
left a half-way house, he might therefore escape from prison, leaving the jury only one 
alternative: the death penalty. 
Both during the initial portion of closing argument and again during rebuttal, the 
prosecution told the jury that they did not have to find him guilty of the other offenses to 
consider those offenses as aggravating circumstances. In the first part of closing, 
although the prosecutor told the jury that they must find aggravating circumstances 
beyond a reasonable doubt, he nonetheless told the jury: "it's not your job to say he's 
guilty or not guilty of those crimes, it's only your job to consider whether or not they 
should be used as aggravating circumstances." Trial Tr. 839-40. This had the effect of 
misrepresenting or reducing the burden of proof to establish those aggravating 
circumstances. Again on rebuttal, the prosecution confused the burden of proof regarding 
aggravating circumstances: 
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I would simply remind you that the state has argued that there are a number of 
aggravating circumstances. Some of those are additional crimes that the defendant 
has not been convicted of. That's the crime of attempted murder of Rolf Tiede, the 
kidnapings, the robberies, the thefts, the flight afterwards, the possession of a 
weapon by a person on parole. Now you don't have to find that each and everyone 
of these have been proven to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt to 
impose the penalty of death. There are a number of them, some eight or nine. And 
I think when you look at it you'll come to the conclusion that the state has proven 
each and every one of those crimes and their aggravating factors. But you don't 
have to find them in order to come to the determination that the appropriate 
penalty is death. You can find that simply from the aggravated circumstances of 
the killing itself. 
Trial TR, 872-73 (emphasis added). 
In the First Amended Petition and in the Petitioner's Response to the State's 
Motion for Summary Judgment Mr. Taylor raised several claims regarding error injury 
instructions that were given and in the failure to give certain proposed jury instructions. 
Post-Conviction R.746-57. In the post-conviction pleadings, Mr. Taylor argued that the 
instructions were erroneous and prejudicial because they were unreasonably weighted in 
favor of death, there was no provision for a life sentence but only consideration for death 
or non-unanimous death, and there is no explanation in the record for why proposed 
instructions explaining the meaning of a life sentence and presumption of a life sentence 
were withdrawn. 
D. Rule 23B Hearing 
After Mr. Levine was discharged from further representation of both Mr. Holland 
and Mr. Taylor, Bruce Savage was appointed to represent Mr. Taylor. Mr. Savage raised 
three issues at the Rule 23B remand hearing: 
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a) by misinforming Mr. Taylor about the effect of a guilty plea to capital murder 
charges, and what evidence would be presented at the penalty phase; 
(b) by asserting a philosophy about the role of a criminal defense attorney that 
conflicted with his duty to represent Mr. Taylor thus causing Mr. Taylor to plead 
guilty involuntarily; and 
(c) by not receiving adequate funds to represent Mr. Taylor thus creating a conflict 
of interest. 
Mr. Savage conducted no independent investigation and raised no claims or 
objections regarding jury selection, jury instructions or voir dire, prejudicial evidence 
presented at the penalty phase, or improper arguments made by the state lawyers. See 
Rule 23B proceedings; State v. Taylor, at 687 (appellate counsel "fail[ed] to identify any 
mitigating information that might have been uncovered by additional investigation of 
another psychological exam"). He argued that Mr. Levine had a conflict of interest, but 
spend considerable time presenting evidence addressing the first prong of ineffective 
assistance of counsel test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
He questioned Mr. Levine about the investigation, the consultation or hiring of experts, 
and scope of Levine's overall investigation and trial preparation. See (Statement of Facts 
outlined above describing Levine's pretrial investigation). In fact, he called at least two 
witnesses, John Hill and Joan Watt, to testify about so-called Strickland standards that 
were in place in 1991, during Mr. Taylor's penalty phase. Rule 23BTR, 1286-98.9 He 
was not prepared, however, to demonstrate the prejudice prong of Strickland. Rule 23B 
9
 In fact, the court recessed to read the Strickland case before listening to Mr. 
Hill's testimony. Rule 23BTR, 1298 & 1300. 
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TR, 1701-02, 1734, 1737. 
F. John Hill, the director of the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association testified 
about lawyer competency standards in capital cases. Rule 23BTR, 1281-1386. Mr. Hill 
discussed minimal standards for appointment of counsel, duties of trial counsel in 
defending capital cases, and enactment of national performance standards in 1989. Rule 
23B TR, 1319, 1345, 1353. Mr. Hill was specifically asked how an attorney should 
respond to harmful information in a psychological report. He responded that, at a 
minimum, the attorney should file a motion in limine before making any strategic 
decisions about use of psychological information. Moreover, Mr. Hill discussed the 
absolute duty to fully investigate psychological information: 
Certainly negative information would have to be, you'd have to investigate to see 
if it could be countered. And it would be required, I think, to initiate further 
psychiatric examination, physical examinations regarding organic damage, or 
anything that you could to explain away the negative information contained in an 
alienist's report, (emphasis added) 
Rule 23B TR, 1346-47(emphasis added). 
Joan Watt, the chief appellate attorney from the Salt Lake Legal Defender 
Association reiterated the importance of conducting a thorough investigation, and like 
Mr. Hill, discussed the minimum or baseline standards articulated by the American Bar 
Association Standards for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty 
Cases. Id. 1452-53. 
E. Appellate Decision 
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The trial court rejected the claims of ineffective assistance. The matter was 
appealed to the Utah Supreme Court. The Court affirmed, but again noted the lack of 
evidence in addressing the prejudice prong of Strickland: 
Taylor, on the other hand, has failed to provide any evidence that if Levine had 
performed any of the suggested investigations, the outcome of the trial would have 
differed. He does not even suggest what such investigation would have revealed 
and how the revelations would have improved his position with the jury. 
State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681, 685 (Utah 1997). 
Despite Rule 23B counsel's failure to address the prejudice prong of Strickland, 
the Supreme Court nonetheless identified the "failure to pursue mitigation evidence" as 
an area raising "a significant question." Taylor, 947 P.2d at 686. This Court noted that 
"the failure to perform an adequate mitigation workup represents ineffective assistance of 
counsel." Id. at 687. The Court repeatedly recognized Rule 23B counsel's failure to 
identify, develop, or present any information addressing the prejudice prong of Strickland 
as a major area of concern.10 
10
 The Court emphasized its frustration with Rule 23B counsel's failure to present 
any helpful evidence to support Mr. Taylor's claims: 
Moreover, Taylor fails to identify any mitigating information that might have been 
uncovered by additional investigation or another psychological exam. . . . Taylor, 
947 P.2d at 687 
A defendant must show not only that counsel failed to seek mitigating evidence, 
but also that some actually existed to be found.... Id. 
Taylor has not suggested a helpful strategy that would have been supported by 
evidence not known to Levine. Failure to investigate mitigating factors can 
34 
This Court held that "although very limited, [Levine's mitigation investigation] 
appears to have been adequate." Taylor, 947 P.2d at 687. Throughout the opinion, the 
Court expresses concern with trial counsel's representation. Taylor, 947 P.2d at 689 
("Levine's [closing] argument [was] so minimal as to represent the lower threshold of 
reasonableness " Although it affirmed the imposition of the death penalty the Court 
notes that "Levine's representation of Taylor does not illustrate ideal defense attorney 
behavior.") Justice Stewart would reverse the case noting that the mitigation 
investigation here was inadequate. Id. at 90 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Moreover, Justice 
Stewart held that "[Levine] clearly should have been disqualified from representing 
[Taylor] and any other capital defendant because of his failure to adhere to fundamental 
professional standards of competence and conduct." Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
F. Post-Conviction Proceedings 
Mr. Taylor filed a petition raising twenty-five claims. See Post-Conviction 
Record, 521. Petitioner reviewed the issues raised at the penalty phase and Rule 23B 
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel only where such factors actually exist 
and may be productively used in the penalty phase.. . . Id. 
To demonstrate that counsel made an unreasonable judgment in not pursuing an 
investigation further, a defendant must identify potentially mitigating 
circumstances that the investigation would have uncovered.... Id. 
[Taylor] has, quite simply, failed to identify deficiencies in Levine's performance 
that had any apparent affect on the outcome of his penalty trial Taylor, 947 
P.2d at 688 
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hearing, conducted a partial mitigation investigation, and identified important errors in 
the earlier proceedings that were neither identified nor addressed before this Court. 
1. Mitigation 
Dr. Linda Gummow, a licensed psychologist with a speciality in clinical 
psychology, examined Mr. Taylor to determine if he suffered from neuropsychiatric 
injury. Post-Conviction R. 1380. Dr. Gummow found that Mr. Taylor suffers from 
moderate to severe brain damage which affected his ability to "fully appreciate the 
wrongfulness of his conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of law." Id. 
1388. She concluded that the information contained in the prior presentence reports, 
prison and jail medical files, prior psychological information existing in 1989, and 
information observed and noted by family members, "were sufficient issues in 1991 to 
raise the issue of brain damage as a possible explanation for Mr. Taylor's criminal acts." 
Id. at 1383. 
Moreover, Dr, Gummow noted that Dr. Moench wras unaware that Mr. Taylor had 
suffered from several head injuries and repeated exposure to farm pesticides.11 Id. at 
1383-84. Like Dr. Moench, Dr. Gummow also recognized how "[fjrontal lobe brain 
injury can be associated with violent behavior over which the individual has little 
control." Id. at 1384. 
11
 Exposure to farm pesticides was a known cause of brain damage in 1991. See 
Caro v. Woodford, 280 F.3d 1247, 1249-50 (9th Cir. 2002) 
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Mr. Hill likewise concluded that there was sufficient evidence prior to trial so that 
"[tjrial counsel should have consulted a neurologist and other medical experts in this case 
to determine if Mr. Taylor had brain injury or brain damage." Post-Conviction R. 1394. 
"It was widely known in this community and throughout the country in 1990, that a 
capital attorney could persuasively present evidence of brain injury to address at least two 
of the seven [statutory] mitigating circumstances . . . . " Id. 
Petitioner conducted a partial mitigation investigation with the assistance of a 
mitigation specialist, Post-Conviction R. 729-31, an investigator with expertise in capital 
investigations, id, 1400-08,l2 and a licensed psychologist with a specialty in clinical 
neuropsychology.13 Id. 1380-89. 
In the course of that investigation, petitioner identified a minimum of thirty-one 
separate sources of information relating to Mr. Taylor's background that neither trial 
counsel nor appellate counsel discovered or interviewed. Post-Conviction R. 730. 
In addition to brain damage, it was evident in 1991 that Mr. Taylor suffered from 
severe mental health problems that were known as early as 1989. In 1989, his sister Kay 
Auble, sent a letter to the Washington County Judge expressing grave concerns about her 
12
 The trial court granted the state's motion to strike Mr. Cilwick's affidavit on the 
ground that the information is not admissible in a post-conviction death penalty case. As 
argued below, petitioner contends that the information is admissible in a penalty phase 
proceeding and therefore the court erred in striking the affidavit. 
13
 See also Ex Parte Affidavit of Richard P. Mauro Regarding Post-Conviction 
Duties, Post-Conviction R. 605-618 (discussing other aspects of investigation that will be 
necessary prior to trial or a penalty phase). 
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brother's mental health. She first observed these traits at an early age describing her 
brother as either depressed or paranoid, a loner, a person who did not fit in, and suggested 
the need for psychiatric intervention. Id. at 1328. She also described a history of alcohol 
abuse beginning in junior high school. Id. 
Mr. Taylor's father also sent a letter to the Washington County judge explaining 
that Von never graduated from high school, had difficulty holding a job and experienced 
"psychological problems" as a result of a prior accident leaving a facial scar. Id. at 1328-
29. Likewise, in 1989, his brother Robert Taylor told Diagnostic Investigator, Robyn 
Williams that Von "has some pretty serious mood swings," and described a prior suicide 
attempt. Id. at 1329. 
Mr. Taylor also presented evidence of head injuries and exposure to farm 
chemicals. Mr. Taylor suffered the first head injury when he was two years old in 1967 
after falling down a flight of stairs and being hospitalized. Id. at 1329. In 1977, he 
suffered a severe facial injury when an aerosol can exploded in a campfire imbedding 
shrapnel into his face and arm. In 1979, he was hospitalized after being thrown from a 
pick up truck in a roll-over accident. On April 8, 1983 he crashed his motorcycle and was 
again hospitalized. In elementary school, Mr. Taylor was standing upright in a plastic 
saucer while being pulled along the sidewalk. He fell face first landing on his forehead, 
causing a "doorknob-sized" bump on his forehead. In 1989, while at the Utah State 
Prison in Draper, Mr. Taylor hit his head on a metal stairwell. After that incident, up to 
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today, he suffers from severe migraine headaches and has occasionally taken medication 
for that malady. Post-Conviction R. 1400-05 
During the 1970fs and 1980's, Mr. Taylor spent summers working on the family 
farm in Idaho. He was repeatedly exposed to pesticides and other farm chemicals. 
Family members recall use of chemicals in controlling insects, various poisons used to 
control rodents and gophers, and use of fertilizers. These various chemicals were applied 
by hand, spray, and crop duster. At times, Mr. Taylor was standing under the crop duster 
as it sprayed chemicals on the field; at other times Mr. Taylor had direct contact with 
chemicals when they were sprayed by hand or while changing the sprinkler heads 
immediately after spraying. Mr. Taylor's sisters recall suffering from headaches and 
nausea after pesticides were sprayed onto the field. Id. at 1329, 1384,1403-04. 
Additionally, there is a significant history of substance abuse and alcoholism in 
Mr. Taylor's maternal and paternal families. Thomas Taylor's father was an alcoholic 
who died of cirrhosis of the liver. Mrs. Taylor also had a family history of alcoholism 
and what appears to be depression.14 Four of Mr. Taylor's brothers have been treated for 
alcoholism, drug abuse, and mental health problems. Steven Taylor, a brother with whom 
Von was close to in the late 1980fs, is completely disabled because of alcohol, drugs and 
14
 Mrs. Taylor describes conduct of parents and grandparents that today would be 
recognized as clinical depression, although because family members would be over one 
hundred years old, there was no formal diagnosis. Moreover, as Mrs. Taylor, who is 
nearly eighty explained, people didn't go to doctors for those things back in those days. 
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mental health problems. He receives social security benefits and cannot work. Steven's 
alcohol, drug use, and mental health problems were widely known in 1989, and are 
mentioned in report prepared by Dr. Moench. John Taylor, who is two years older than 
Von, was placed in an inpatient psychiatric unit for mental health problems and 
alcoholism. He has been prescribed various anti-depression medication including Zoloft 
and Wellbutrin. Thomas, who is a few years older than Von, has also undergone inpatient 
alcohol and mental health treatment at the LDS Dayspring Program. He is an admitted 
alcoholic who also suffers from clinical depression. Von's sister, Cheryl Nix, has been 
treated for clinical depression and panic disorder and takes Zoloft, Trazadone, and Paxil, 
and may be obsessive compulsive. Von's other sister, Sana Johnson, has been treated for 
clinical depression and takes various anti-depressant medication. Robert Taylor, Mr. 
Taylor's older brother, has also been treated for clinical depression. Post-Conviction R. 
1330, 1387, 1404-05. 
Von Taylor was drinking alcohol frequently during the late 1980's. In 1989, David 
G. Christensen, an investigator for the Utah Office of Adult Probation and Parole 
believed that Mr. Taylor had "a possible health reaction to alcohol." Christensen based 
this on three factors: (1) "a history of diabetes in the [Taylor] family and [Von's] inability 
to gain weight. . . indicating] . . . diabetes or hypoglycemia . . . ; " (2) Von became 
"crazy" when he drank alcohol; and (3) Von had been drinking heavily on the night of the 
burglary at the Leavitt's home. See Presentence Investigation Report, Case No. 1991, p. 
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10. Christensen recommended that Mr. Taylor undergo a ninety day diagnostic 
evaluation "[b]ecause of [Mr. Taylor's] exceptional family relationships and extended 
arrest-free history and perceived psychological problems . . . . " Mr. Taylor's 
consumption of alcohol was consistent with the maternal and paternal history of 
alcoholism in the family. 
The 1989 Presentence Report contained a section styled "Substance Abuse." A 
subsection of that category contained an explanation of Mr. Taylor's alcohol use history: 
Mr. Taylor reports he began drinking alcoholic beverages at approximately 
age fourteen. He reports this drinking was to become accepted by peers. 
He was drinking three to four beers on weekends, but reported when he 
drank he became "crazy." He quit drinking as a teenager, but began 
drinking again after he became depressed in St. George, because he could 
not find employment and was having problems with bills. He was under the 
influence of drugs and alcohol at the time he committed the present offense. 
It is felt, because of the defendant's actions regarding the present offense 
and his past alcohol abuse problems he would benefit from alcohol abuse 
treatment and counseling. 
Von's brother Robert, who was the Summit County Building Inspector in 
December 1990, recalls showing police several empty whiskey bottles and pills strewn 
about on tables in the Taylor family cabin which was located in close proximity to the 
Tiede cabin where the homicides occurred. Post-Conviction R. 1405. 
Mr. Taylor's siblings were never interviewed in preparation for the penalty phase 
or the Rule 23B hearing. Post-Conviction R. 1401. His siblings are much older than Von, 
and because of this age difference, helped raise him. If interviewed before the penalty 
phase, they would have described Von as a "follower," a person who was easily lead and 
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manipulated. Id. At 1402-03. Although they loved their brother, each sibling can describe 
stories where Von was manipulated and nearly always lead by others. Id. 
Mr. Taylor's siblings would all have offered powerful mitigating evidence. Id. 
1400-06. Each would testify that Von was gentle and peaceful as a child. Id. at 1401. 
He was known for compassion and had no prior history of violence or fighting. Id. Each 
would also testify about personal, loving interactions with their brother in circumstances 
at the farm in Idaho, on family vacations to Flaming Gorge, Yellowstone and other 
places, and while the family lived in Utah. Id. Because Mr. Taylor had few friends, his 
siblings provide the most important and complete picture of Von. When the siblings were 
interviewed, Mr. and Mrs. Taylor, Von's parents, proclaimed that they were unaware of 
many the stories and antidotes that the siblings observed, because his parents were not 
present during the incidents. 
To complement the testimony of family members, Dr. Gummow could have 
testified that Mr. Taylor "was not and is not a leader in social situations, and he is readily 
influenced by others," that he has "a positive family history with no history of juvenile 
infractions or diagnoses of conduct disorders," and that his "social characteristics are 
inconsistent with the violent acts for which he was convicted." Post-Conviction R. 1387. 
Mr. Taylor raised a total of twenty-five claims most of which evolve around 
ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel. Those claims which are largely 
described above consist of legal errors that made the underlying proceedings unfair, the 
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failure to investigate and present mitigating evidence, and general ineffective assistance 
of counsel claims injury selection process Jury instructions, and prejudicial evidence 
presented at the penalty phase. 
In response to the First Amended Petition, the state filed a motion for summary 
judgment. Mr. Taylor responded by asking the trial court to stay the response to the 
summary judgment motion and instead asked the court to allow the parties to complete 
discovery.15 Post-Conviction R. 1062-69. The trial court denied permission to engage in 
discovery and instead ordered petitioner to respond to the state's motion for summary 
judgment. Id. at 1176. Mr. Taylor responded to the motion for summary judgment. Id. at 
1304. In response to the motion for summary judgment, Mr. Taylor submitted four 
affidavits. The state moved to strike three of the four affidavits on the grounds that the 
evidence presented in one of the affidavits would not be admissible in a capital penalty 
15
 Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65C(1) requires a party to seek permission from 
the court to conduct discovery. That provision states as follows: 
Discovery under Rule 16 through 37 shall be allowed by the court upon 
motion of a party and a determination that there is good cause to believe 
that discovery is necessary to provide a party with evidence that is likely to 
be admissible in an evidentiary hearing. The court may require either the 
petitioner or the respondent to obtain any relevant transcript or court 
records. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65C(1). 
If a party does not seek permission to conduct discovery, and instead responds to a 
motion for summary judgment, then the pleadings are closed and no discovery is allowed. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(i) (once a petitioner submits a response to motion for summary 
judgment then "[n]o further pleadings or amendments will be permitted unless ordered by 
the court.") 
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phase, that John Hill was not a qualified expert to opine regarding a capital attorney's 
performance, and that hearsay relating witness statements would not be admissible at a 
penalty phase hearing. The trial court struck the affidavits. Id. at 1935. 
The trial court thereafter granted the state's motion for summary judgment without 
an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 1928. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in granting the state's motion for summary judgment because 
a material issue of fact exists regarding the claims raised in this post-conviction 
proceeding. The court failed to apply clearly established federal law in evaluating the 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims and erred in its legal conclusions. The proper 
application of the Post-Conviction Remedies Act should, at a minimum result in a 
reversal of Mr. Taylor's death sentence and a remand for a new penalty phase. 
POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES ACT. RULE 65. CASE LAW 
This action was initiated pursuant to the Utah Post-Conviction Remedies Act. In 
1996, the Utah Legislature enacted the Utah Post-Conviction Remedies Act, Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 78-35a-101 to -202, which "establishes a substantive legal remedy for any person 
who challenges a conviction or sentence for a criminal offense and who has exhausted all 
other legal remedies " Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-102(l). The Act establishes five 
grounds for relief: 
(a) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was imposed in violation of the 
United States Constitution or Utah Constitution; 
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(b) the conviction was obtained under a statute that is in violation of the United 
States Constitution or Utah Constitution; 
(c) the sentence was imposed in an unlawful manner, or probation was imposed or 
revoked in an unlawful manner; 
(d) the petitioner had ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the United 
States Constitution or Utah Constitution; 
(e) newly discovered material evidence exists that requires the court to vacate the 
conviction or sentence, because: 
(i) neither petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the evidence at the 
time of trial or sentencing or in time to include the evidence in any 
previously filed post-trial motion or post-conviction proceeding, and that 
the evidence could not have been discovered through the exercise of 
reasonable diligence; 
(ii) the material evidence was not merely cumulative of evidence that was 
known; 
(iii) the material evidence is not merely impeachment evidence; and 
(iv) viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered material 
evidence demonstrates that no reasonable trier of fact could have found the 
petitioner guilty of the offense or subject to the sentence received. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-104 (1). 
A petitioner has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of evidence, facts 
necessary to grant relief. Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-105. Once a petitioner has plead 
facts entitling a petitioner to relief, the respondent then has the burden of pleading 
grounds of preclusion as outlined in section 78-35a-106. Id. Once a ground has been 
pled, "the petitioner has the burden to disprove its existence by a preponderance of the 
evidence." Id. Section 78-35a-106 sets out the factors that preclude relief: 
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(1) A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground that: 
(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial motion; 
(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal; 
(c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal; 
(d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction 
relief or could have been, but was not, raised in a previous request for post-
conviction relief; or 
(e) is barred by the limitation period established in Section 78-35a-107. 
A person is still eligible for post-conviction relief, however, if the failure to raise 
the claim at trial or on appeal was due to ineffective assistance of counsel. Utah Code 
Ann. 78-35a-106(2). 
A petition for post-conviction review is a collateral attack of a conviction and is 
generally not a substitute for a direct appeal. Carter v. Galetka, 44 P.3d 626, 633 (Utah 
2001)(hereinafter "Carter III"); Gardner v. Holden, 888, P.2d 608 (Utah 1994). The 
noted exception to the above-stated rule is when unusual circumstances exist-situations 
where there is "an obvious injustice or a substantial and prejudicial denial of a 
constitutional right.5" Carter III, at 633. quoting Hurst v. Cook, 111 P.2d 1029, 1035 
(Utah 1989). This Court, in Carter III, cited to Justice Stewart's concurrence in 
Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1114-15 (Utah 1983)(Stewart, J. concurring) in 
discussing unusual circumstances: 
we have repeatedly declared that any claims of error or impropriety should be 
asserted in the regular procedure provided for on appeals and that, if that is not 
done, a writ of habeas corpus may not be used as a belated appeal. Nevertheless, 
howsoever desirable it may be to adhere to the rules, the law should not be so blind 
and unreasoning that where an injustice has resulted the victim should be without 
remedy. For that reason, as indicated in the cited cases, the writ should be available 
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in rare cases, where it appears that there is a strong likelihood that there has been 
such unfairness, or failure to accord due process of law, that it would be wholly 
unconscionable not to reexamine the conviction. 
"When a habeas petitioner alleges that his counsel was ineffective for failing to 
raise an issue on appeal, we examine the merits of the omitted issue." Carter III, at 639-
40. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN STRIKING THE AFFIDAVITS OF 
JOHN HILL AND TED CILWICK 
Before addressing the substantive issues regarding the court's granting of the 
summary judgment motion it is first important to address the trial court's ruling on the 
submitted affidavits. 
A. John Hill Affidavit. 
The trial court ordered paragraph ll16 of Mr. Hill's affidavit struck ruling he is 
16
 Paragraph 11 reads as follows: 
It was well known in the third district in 1990 and 1991, brain damage affects 
human behavior in significant and dramatic ways. There is a high correlation 
between brain injury and violent conduct over which the person has little control. 
Brain injury is often the cause of conduct associated with criminal behavior. Brain 
damage is associated with gross disturbances in judgment and reasoning, 
disinhibitions of impulses, and in personality changes. This is especially relevant 
to the penalty phase hearing as brain damage impairs those cognitive functions 
associated with an individual's self-regulation of behavior, resulting in irrational 
decision making, the inability to inhibit behavioral impulses, or the inability to 
accurately evaluate the consequences of one's behavior through reasoning. 
Evidence of brain injury is obviously a critical and important component of a 
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"[incompetent to offer testimony about the effects of brain damage." Mr. Hill, 
however, was earlier qualified as an expert in this matter,17 and testified about mitigation 
investigations, mental health investigations, and strategic decisions to consider in the 
presentation of mental health evidence in capital cases. See Rule 23B TR, 1281-1386. 
Even if Mr. Hill had not been previously qualified, his affidavit nonetheless sets forth 
sufficient qualifications to support his conclusions. See Gaw State Dep ft of Tramp, 798 
P.2d 1130,1137 (Utah App. 1990) Mr. Hill is the director of the Salt Lake County Legal 
Defender Association. Post-Conviction R. 1392. He has represented accused persons 
charged with capital offenses, but more importantly, oversees and ensures that attorneys 
from his office are competent and qualified to represent indigent persons charged with 
capital offenses. Id. He is accordingly familiar with the standards for representation of 
capital defendants, how investigations of such cases should be conducted, and what types 
of mental health evidence are important to present in mitigation. 
Mr. Hill's opinions in paragraph 11 are legitimate expert opinions designed to 
address the central question in this litigation: whether prior counsel was ineffective for 
failing to present important evidence of brain damage to the trier of fact. Mr. Hill met the 
standard for expert qualification in 1995 when he testified at the Rule 23B hearing and 
penalty phase hearing because it addresses the two statutory mitigating 
circumstances addressed above. 
17
 The state conceded that Mr. Hill is "an expert witness with regard to conduct of 
a penalty phase " Rule 23BTR, 1335. 
48 
meets the standard in his affidavit submitted with the response to the motion for summary 
judgment. See Utah Rule of Evid. 702 ("If scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."); Gaw v. State, 798 
P.2d 1130 (Utah App. 1990) 
Moreover, because of his expertise as both a capital trial attorney and director of a 
large public defender office, he has "consistently remained familiar with [capital] 
representation standards and practices...." Paragraph 11 simply describes the 
importance of brain injury as persuasive mitigation in a capital case, how "brain injury is 
often the cause of conduct associated with criminal behavior," and how that evidence is 
important to address two of the statutory mitigating factors under Utah's capital 
sentencing statute. See Smith v. Mullin, 379 F.3d 919 (10th Cir. 2004) (explaining how 
failure to present evidence of brain injury constitutes ineffective assistance); Caro v. 
Woodford, 280 F.3d 1247, 1258 (9th Cir. 2002)("Because it has been established that Caro 
suffers from brain damage, the delicate balance between his moral capability and the 
value of his life would certainly teeter toward life.") Gaw, 798 P.2d at 1137 (articulating 
rule for admission of expert affidavits). 
He states both the basis of his conclusion and the facts relied upon in reaching his 
conclusions regarding the importance of brain injury as mitigation in a capital case. See 
49 
Gaw, at 1137. The trial court accordingly erred in striking paragraph 11 from Mr. Hill's 
affidavit. 
B. Cilwick Affidavit 
The trial court struck Mr. Cilwick's affidavit finding that it "contains primarily 
hearsay that would not be inadmissible in this post-conviction case." Post-Conviction R. 
1938. Pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e), an affidavit in opposition to 
summary judgment "shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as 
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is 
competent to testify to the matters stated therein." (emphasis added). 
Mr. Cilwick is "a certified paralegal and licensed private investigator (Utah 
License Number 100268)." Post-Conviction R. 1400. He has received special training in 
the investigation of capital cases and has been court-appointed or retained in thirteen Utah 
capital cases - eleven at the trial level and two in post-conviction. Id. Mr. Cilwick has 
personal knowledge of the information contained in his affidavit and performed duties 
consistent with his role as an investigator in a capital case. Mr. Cilwick's duties were to 
interview family members and compile information for use in a capital penalty phase 
hearing. 
That information is relevant and admissible in a penalty phase hearing through Mr. 
Cilwick. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207 (1990); State v. Kell, 61 P.3d 1019,1033 
(hearsay in disciplinary reports "was highly probative of defendant's character and 
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relevant for capital sentencing purposes"); see Wiggins v. Smith, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2543 
(2003)(acknowledging a relaxed standard at penalty phase, Supreme Court accepts 
hearsay evidence of mitigation in post-conviction proceedings relayed exclusively 
through investigator who interviewed family members).18 In light of the capital 
sentencing statute, this Court's prior rulings regarding admission of hearsay at penalty 
phase proceedings, and the United States Supreme Court's acceptance of hearsay under 
strikingly similar circumstances, petitioner contends that the trial court erred in excluding 
Mr. Cilwick's affidavit. 
II. MR. TAYLOR'S GUILTY PLEA AND CONVICTION WERE 
UNLAWFULLY INDUCED OR NOT MADE VOLUNTARILY WITH THE 
UNDERSTANDING OF THE NATURE OF THE CHARGE AND THE 
CONSEQUENCES OF THE PLEA AND THE PLEA WAS ACCEPTED 
WITHOUT AN ADEQUATE FACTUAL BASIS TO SUPPORT THE 
CAPITAL MURDER CHARGE 
The petition raises a claim that the trial court failed to advise Mr. Taylor of certain 
constitutional rights he gave up when pleading guilty. This claim was never raised by any 
prior counsel nor did any court rule on this issue. This is a claim that should have been 
raised by both trial counsel and appellate counsel, but was not. Both prior counsel were 
ineffective for failing to raise this claim, and therefore this court may accordingly 
18
 Judge Noel, at the time of the penalty phase, thought hearsay evidence was 
admissible at the penalty phase: 
"I think the court is at liberty to introduce evidence that is probative of the 
issues in a penalty hearing, and therefore will allow it [the hearsay 
statement of witness Manley] to come in." Trial TR, at 652. 
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consider this claim. Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106 (2)("a person may be eligible for 
relief on the basis that the ground could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal, 
if the failure to raise that ground is due to ineffective assistance of counsel."). 
A trial judge has the responsibility of ensuring that constitutional and Rule 11 
requirements are complied with when a guilty plea is entered. State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 
1309, 1312 (Utah 1987). When considering motions to withdraw guilty pleas, appellate 
courts review the record compiled at the change of plea hearing, the change of plea 
affidavits and other related documents, and sometimes, the surrounding facts and 
circumstances underlying the plea. State v. Dean, 95 P.3d 276, 279 (Utah 2004); 
Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1313; Salazar v. Warden, 852 P.2d 988, 992 (Utah 1993). A person 
is entitled to relief on a motion to withdraw a plea "only if the alleged violation of rule 11 
is also a violation of his constitutional rights." Salazar, 852 P.2d at 991. 
To preserve this claim for review, an accused must file a motion to withdraw a 
plea within thirty days after entry of judgment or sentencing. State v. Ostler, 31 P.3d 528, 
530 (Utah 2001).l9 When the motion lacks specific grounds for withdrawing the plea, the 
court can only reach the issue by applying a plain error analysis. Dean, 95 P.3d at 280; 
see State v. Reyes, 40 P.3d 630 (Utah 2002). The error analysis involves a two-part test: 
19
 When Mr. Taylor entered a guilty plea in 1991, the statute allowed an accused to 
file a motion to withdraw a plea within thirty days of entry of the plea. That statute was 
enacted in 1989. State v. Ostler, 31 P.3d at 530. The Utah Supreme Court has interpreted 
entry of plea to mean thirty days after final disposition or sentence has been imposed. 
Ostler, 31 P.3d at 530. 
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1. error; 2. that is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable outcome for appellant. 
In this case, Mr. Taylor entered pleas of guilty to two counts of capital murder on 
May 1, 1991. Trial R, 105, 113-14. The court entered the Judgment and Sentence of 
Death on May 24, 1991. Trial R, 243-46. On June 1, 1991, eight days after entry of 
judgment, Mr. Taylor filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, citing two grounds: 
1. That co-defendant Edward Deli was convicted of only second degree murder 
under the same facts which Defendant pleaded guilty to Capital Homicide; 
2. That the Statement of Defendant signed by Defendant, VON LESTER 
TAYLOR, to wit: Paragraph 10 thereof, failed to appropriately and correctly 
advise the Defendant that a Motion to Withdraw the entry of his guilty plea could 
only be based upon good cause and in the discretion of the court. 
The court denied the motion on June 18, 1991, addressing only the two grounds 
outlined above. Trial Record, 281. 
To succeed on a plain error claim,20 Mr. Taylor must show that an error existed, 
the error should have been obvious to the court and the error is harmful. 
Here, the trial court neglected to inform Mr. Taylor "of the right to the 
presumption of innocence." Utah R. Crim P. 11. Moreover, as more fully discussed in 
the petition, there was confusion regarding the use of the dismissed counts as aggravating 
20
 Application of the plain error analysis is the same as the '" obvious injustice or 
substantial and prejudicial denial of a constitutional right,"5 standard which a petitioner 
must demonstrate to prevail in post-conviction. Carter, 44 F.3d at 633 (quoting Hurst v. 
Cook, 111 P.2d 1029, 1035 (Utah 1989)). 
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circumstances at the penalty phase.21 See First Amended Petition. The court failed to 
clearly state that those charges could be used as aggravating circumstances at the penalty 
phase. Moreover, there is no explanation of the difference between his testimony at trial 
and testimony at the penalty phase. The court further does not explain the differences 
between testimony at the penalty phase which subjects Mr. Taylor to cross-examination 
and allocution, which does not subject him to cross-examination. Cumulatively, this error 
is harmful. Even though this Court partially reviewed this claim on direct appeal, Mr. 
Taylor nonetheless asks the Court to reconsider the claim in light of the additional 
evidence presented to the trial court which is discussed below. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT NEITHER TRIAL 
NOR APPELLATE COUNSEL WERE INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO 
INVESTIGATE DISCOVER OR DETECT BRAIN INJURY AND OTHER 
MITIGATION EVIDENCE. 
A. Trial Court Ruling 
In a novel ruling, the trial court found that appellate counsel's failure to pursue an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim at the Rule 23B hearing was strategic. The court 
held that failure to pursue such a claim falls within the "broad range of professional 
judgment. . . ," of competent capital counsel. Post-Conviction R. 1950. Consistent with 
that ruling, the court found that "a more thorough mitigation investigation would not 
necessarily have been helpful. . . ," since appellate counsel was relying upon a theory of 
21
 This was obvious during voir dire when the trial judge told potential juror 
McNeil that she would not be judged to ask whether the car chase happened. 
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conflict of interest. IdP Nonetheless, the trial court pursuant to the "unusual 
circumstances" test, "considered] petitioner's argument with respect to the evidence that 
would have been discovered had trial counsel done a more thorough mitigation workup." 
Id. at 1951. 
The trial court acknowledged that Mr. Taylor suffers from moderate to severe 
brain damage, but rejected that evidence because Mr. Taylor failed to "allege or 
demonstrate . . . that his moderate brain damage is somehow related to his criminal 
conduct involved in this case." Id. at 1952.23 The court concluded that evidence of brain 
injury is only relevant if an accused can establish a connection between the brain injury 
and the homicide. Id. 
B. Effective Assistance of Counsel 
22
 Petitioner contends that appellate counsel was at best confused about what 
theory to pursue since he referred to both the Strickland standard and the conflict standard 
interchangeably and seemed to not understand the difference between the two arguments. 
See First Amended Petition, (citing to portions of Rule 23B record where appellate 
counsel addresses both Strickland claims and conflict claims). Moreover, appellate 
counsel spent considerable time developing a Strickland argument at the Rule 23B 
hearing as evidenced by questions asked about the investigation and performacne 
standards that were in place for capital attorneys in 1991. 
23
 After the court issued its findings and conclusions, petitioner filed a pleading 
styled Objections to Findings and Conclusions. Post-Conviction R. 1898-1905. In that 
pleading petitioner referred the trial court to Tenard v. Dretke, 124 S.Ct. 2562 (2004) 
which found that evidence of impaired functioning is inherently mitigating, regardless of 
whether an accused can establish a nexus between the mental state and the crime. 
Tenard, at 2569-70 (rejecting nexus standard as having "no foundation in the decisions of 
this Court"). The trial court rejected the Supreme Court's holding in Tenard ruling that 
Mr. Taylor's objections were "inappropriate Objections to the proposed Order .. .." 
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Petitioner contends that trial counsel and appellate counsel were both ineffective 
for failing to investigate and discover important mitigation evidence outlined above. The 
court should review this matter under the unusual circumstances test. Carter III, 44 P.3d 
at 639-40. To succeed in on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, an accused must 
show that counsel's performance was deficient meaning that counsel's representation fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390-91 
(2000).24 Once that threshold is met, an accused must then demonstrate that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense. The prejudice prong applies a "but for" test to 
determine prejudice: "but for counsel's unprofessional errors, [would] the result of the 
proceeding have been different[?]" Id. at 391 "A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. This two part test, which 
originated with Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), is now part of "clearly 
established federal law" meaning that if a petitioner can establish the two elements of 
ineffectiveness, he is entitled to post-conviction relief. Tenard, 124 S.Ct. at 2570; 
24
 The United States Supreme Court has found that the standards articulated by the 
American Bar Association Standards for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in 
Death Penalty Cases serve as an appropriate guide in determining the reasonableness of 
trial counsel's investigation. Wiggins, 2536-37 ("we long have referred [to The ABA 
Guidelines] as 'guides to determining what is reasonable.'") quoting Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 
(2000); see also Florida v. Nixon, 125 S.Ct. 551, 562-63 (2004) (citing to ABA 
Guidelines in evaluating counsel's performance at trial); Smith v. Muffin, 379 F.3d 919, 
939 (10th Cir. 2004)(referring to ABA Guidelines in describing duties of capital defense 
counsel). 
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Wiggins, at 2541-42; Williams, 529 U.S. at 391 
C. Mitigation Investigation 
An attorney representing a capital defendant has a duty to conduct a complete and 
thorough investigation in preparation for a penalty phase. Wiggins, at 2532 (the failure to 
expand the mitigation investigation beyond information in an earlier presentence report 
and division of social service records is ineffective assistance of counsel when post-
conviction counsel showed there was additional mitigation found beyond initial reports); 
Williams, at 399 (the failure to discover and present evidence of disadvantaged 
background, low IQ, abuse at hands of father and failure to interview family members is 
ineffective assistance); see Taylor, at 687 ("the failure to perform an adequate mitigation 
workup represents ineffective assistance of counsel). 
In Wiggins v. Smith, the United States Supreme Court reversed Kevin Wiggins 
death sentence after it determined that trial counsel failed to conduct an adequate 
mitigation investigation. Wiggins, at 2141-42. Trial counsels' investigation consisted in 
part of review of a presentence investigation detailing some of Wiggins' personal history. 
They also reviewed "records kept by the Baltimore City Department of Social Services 
(DSS) documenting petitioner's various placements in the State's foster care system." 
Wiggins, at 2536. The attorneys, however, conducted no further investigation, even 
though some of the information in the initial reports suggested the existence of helpful 
mitigation evidence. Id. (The attorneys did not expand their investigation beyond the PSI 
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and social services records) 
In the post-conviction investigation, new counsel conducted a mitigation 
investigation using the information in the PSI and DSS as a starting point. Post-
conviction counsel learned through family members of physical and sexual abuse, and 
additional mitigation evidence. Wiggins, at 2532-33. The investigator reviewed school 
records, social service records, medical records, and foster care records. In reversing 
Wiggins' conviction, the Court found counsel ineffective for failing to pursue further 
investigation: 
Counsel's investigation into Wiggins' background did not reflect reasonable 
professional judgment. Their decision to end their investigation when they 
did was neither consistent with the professional standards that prevailed in 
1989, nor reasonable in light of the evidence counsel uncovered in the 
social services records-evidence that would have led a reasonably 
competent attorney to investigate further. Counsel's pursuit of bifurcation 
until the eve of sentencing and their partial presentation of a mitigation case 
suggest that their incomplete investigation was the result of inattention, not 
reasoned strategic judgment. In deferring to counsel's decision not to 
pursue a mitigation case despite their unreasonable investigation, the 
Maryland Court of Appeals unreasonably applied Strickland. 
Wiggins, at 2541-42. 
In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), as in this case, trial counsel sought to 
present Williams as a "nice boy" during the penalty phase. The trial attorney called 
Williams' mother and two neighbors who both testified that he was a "nice boy" and non-
violent. Williams' attorney also presented testimony from a psychiatrist who said that 
Williams removed bullets from a gun used in a prior robbery so as not to hurt anyone. 
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In the Williams case, as here, the penalty phase evidence was cursory and designed 
merely to show that some friends and his mother thought he was a nice boy. As here, 
there was little evidence presented in mitigation. Williams, like Mr. Taylor had a prior 
felony conviction where a gun was used, and like trial counsel in this case, Williams' 
attorney told the jury it was difficult to find a reason to spare William's life, but they 
should do it anyway. Williams, 529 U.S. at 369; Compare Taylor, 947 P.2d at 688 (trial 
counsel never asked the jury to spare his client's life, although he told them the killing 
must stop somewhere, stated that balancing aggravating and mitigating circumstances was 
extremely difficult if not impossible, but they had to do it anyway, and said to the jury 
that criminals like Mr. Taylor "don't think like you and I"). Like Mr. Taylor, Mr. 
Williams was sentenced to death. On post-conviction review, the Supreme Court 
reversed finding trial counsel ineffective for failing to discover and present mitigating 
evidence which consisted of: 
1. Evidence of Williams' background; 
2. Abuse at the hands of his father; 
3. Testimony from correctional officers who were willing to testify that Williams 
did not pose a danger while incarcerated; 
4. Evidence of commendation given to Williams by prison for breaking up drug 
ring; 
5. Failing to interview or call as witnesses other people who could testify about 
Williams' character; and 
6. Failing to discover and present evidence that Williams was borderline mentally 
retarded. 
Williams, at 399 ("[T]he entire post-conviction record viewed as a whole and cumulative 
of mitigation evidence presented originally, raised a reasonable probability that the result 
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of the sentencing hearing would have been different if competent counsel had presented 
and explained the significance of all the available evidence."). 
The Tenth Circuit has followed the Supreme Court's lead in mitigation cases. See 
Smith, 379 F.3d at 939(trial counsel's failure to understand the importance of borderline 
intellectual functioning, mental illness and brain injury as mitigating circumstances 
constitutes ineffective assistance); Battenfield v. Gibson 236 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 
2001)("[Trial counsel's] failure to investigate Battenfield's background, and his failure to 
explore other readily apparent mitigation possibilities, rendered unreasonable his alleged 
penalty-phase strategy of focusing on sympathy and mercy"); Cargle v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 
1196 (10th Cir. 2003). (failure to investigate and present evidence of premature birth, 
physical and learning problems, history of abuse at hands of father, and evidence of 
mother who loved him and wanted life spared, constitutes ineffective assistance of 
counsel); Osborn v. Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612, 627 (10th Cir. 1988)( Counsel's failure to 
uncover mitigating family background witnesses and medical history when both were 
available constitutes ineffective assistance). 
D. Importance of Brain Injury As Mitigation 
Brain injury is an important mitigating factor in death penalty cases. Caro, at 1254 
(evidence of brain damage "evidence would have provided powerful mitigating evidence 
at the penalty phase of Caro's trial."); Smith, at 942 ("The mitigating evidence omitted in 
Mr. Smith's trial is exactly the sort of evidence that garners the most sympathy from 
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jurors."); See Post-Conviction R, 1389 (Affidavit of Dr. Linda Gummow stating that 
brain damage can affect judgment, cause aggressiveness, and be a persuasive mitigating 
explanation for the person's participation in a violent crime). A person with frontal lobe 
or brain injury will oftentimes participate in "violent behavior over which the person has 
little control." . Caro, at 1253. ("Because it has been established that Caro suffers from 
brain damage, the delicate balance between his moral capability and the value of his life 
would certainly teeter toward life. Therefore, we find that counsel's errors prejudiced 
Caro by rendering the results of his penalty phase trial unreliable"); Smith, at 941,25 
25
 The Tenth Circuit explained the importance of brain injury as mitigating 
evidence: 
Brain damage generally affects three different components. One is the 
component we call intellectual thinking or cognitive. Another component of 
our development is our motor behavior, motor control.... And the third area 
is ... emotional control and emotional regulation. The other two areas also 
affect that. 
The brain injury, in general, will cause damage to the centers of the brain 
and an injury like an hypoxic injury is known to cause damage to the 
particular and specific centers of the brain that are involved in emotional 
regulation. These are generally called the limbic areas of the brain and that's 
what helps to regulate and modulate our emotions. 
Injury of those areas can cause all sorts of problems. Primarily,... when a 
person is stressed or put in a stressful situation, their control over their 
emotions may break down even further. In addition to that would be 
intellectual and cognitive problems of brain injury.... For example, 
intellectually they donft understand what's going on because of the 
intellectual component of the brain injury, then their emotional regulation is 
also disrupted, and so their behavior becomes erratic or out of control or 
aggressive, and any number of emotional problems can result that are 
usually not consistent with whatever is going on in the environment around 
them, and that represents the direct cause of the brain injury, as well as an 
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"[FJrontal brain damage may hinder judgement and cause aggressiveness without 
necessarily diminishing one's intelligence." Caw, 280 F.3d at 1253. That is because 
"damage to one's frontal lobes may not affect other brain functions controlled by the lack 
of the brain, such as motor skills, sensory perception, memory, and speech." Caw, 280 
F.3d at 1253. Indeed, person's who have normal intelligence, perform well in jobs, and 
do well in school may still have brain damage that affects their conduct and behavior. Id. 
(Court granted post-conviction relief finding that defendant had brain injury despite fact 
that he obtained high marks in high school, performed well in Marines, had negative 
blood results for pesticides, reasonably high IQ, rationality of actions in covering up 
murders, and normal psychiatric and neurological evaluations taken both before and after 
his trial). 
Brain injury, however, is a significantly different kind of mental impairment from 
competency or inquiry into insanity. See Caw, 280 F. 3d 1247; Smith, at 943. Indeed, an 
investigation for brain injury is unlike an investigation for insanity. Post-Conviction R. 
1384 ("[t]he tests administered by Dr. Long, Dr. Moench, and Dr. Rindflesh are not 
generally accepted as instruments to diagnose brain damage."); See Caw, 280 F.3d at 
1257 (psychologist's general investigation testimony about state of mind is not sufficient 
to uncover brain damage); Smith, 379 F.3d at 941. 
inability to cope or interact with stress or what's going on in the 
environment in a way that most of us would see to be reasonable or prudent 
or understandable. 
62 
E. Incomplete Investigation 
The information in the prior presentence reports, department of corrections 
documents, Dr. Long's evaluation suggesting significant mental disturbance, and the 
information in Dr. Moench's report should have put a minimally competent capital 
attorney on notice that additional investigation was necessary. Wiggins, at 2141-42 
("Their decision to end their investigation when they did was neither consistent with the 
professional standards that prevailed in 1989, nor reasonable in light of the evidence 
counsel uncovered in the social services records-evidence that would have led a 
reasonably competent attorney to investigate further"); Williams, 529 U.S. at 399;(failure 
to discover and present evidence of prior abuse, family character witnesses, and 
borderline mental retardation, constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel); Caro, 280 
F.3d at 1249-50 (failure "to investigate and present evidence of the impact that exposure 
to neurotoxicants and child abuse had on his brain; the penalty phase jury was deprived of 
this critical explanation in determining Caro's culpability for his crime."); Coleman v. 
Mitchell, 268 F.3d 417 (6th Cir. 2001) (Failure to independently investigate mitigating 
evidence of defendant's personal background, psychological history and potential organic 
brain dysfunction and present such evidence during penalty phase, resulted in prejudice 
entitling defendant to post-conviction relief); State v. Duncan, 894 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 
2004) (the failure to discover and present evidence of chronic, long lasting psychotic 
disturbance, evidence of delusional paranoid thinking, and possibility of brain injury is 
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ineffective assistance). 
Here, neither trial nor appellate counsel conducted any independent investigation 
into Mr. Taylor's background. Levine collected no school records, independent medical 
records or any other records. He consulted no experts except someone named "Chuck"of 
Charles whose last name and topic discussed are unknown. His "investigator" possibly 
interviewed one police officer but prepared no reports. Her role in the case, however, 
was as a paralegal assigned to help organize the file. Appellate counsel likewise 
conducted no investigation. He readily admitted that he was unprepared to demonstrate 
how the result could have been different if a proper investigation had been done. 
Although he asked questions about gathering records, interviewing witnesses, and 
preparing for the penalty phase, he similarly did no investigation in any of those areas. 
See Taylor, (this Court expressed concern with the lack of investigation on the part of 
appellate counsel). 
In addition to the evidence of brain injury, a minimal investigation would have 
revealed important information from family members about Mr. Taylor's lack of 
violence, peacefulness, and how repeated taunting by other children at school affected 
him. Tenard, 124 S.Ct. at 270 ("Virtually no limits are placed on the relevant mitigating 
evidence a capital defendant may introduce concerning his own circumstances."); Cargle, 
317 F.3d at 1216 (failure to call family members who would talk about love for defendant 
contributed to court's finding of ineffectiveness); Battenfield, 236 F.3d at 1226(failure 
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to present evidence from family and friends that defendant was known for compassion, 
gentleness, and lack of violence, even when provoked contributed to ineffectiveness 
finding); see Carter III, at 639-40 (no ineffective assistance when counsel presented 
significant mitigation including evidence of troubled childhood, brain injury causing 
increased likelihood of violence, history of alcohol use, and evidence of love that family 
shared with defendant). This is important mitigation evidence that is always admissible 
and critical at a penalty phase. Smith, 379 F.3d at 942 ( "The mitigating evidence omitted 
in Mr. Smith's trial is exactly the sort of evidence that garners the most sympathy from 
jurors.") 
Simply talking to Mr. Taylor's family members would have revealed this important 
mitigation evidence. 
This investigation here does not meet the minimal standards expected of a 
competent capital attorney. Wiggins, at 2537 (The baseline for reasonable performance in 
1990 was set by ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in 
Death Penalty Cases); Smith, 379 F.3d at 942 ("The Supreme Court has, time and again, 
cited "the standards for capital defense work articulated by the American Bar Association 
(ABA)... as 'guides to determining what is reasonable'" performance"); ABA Guidelines, 
11.8.6, p. 133. Levine's explanation that he stopped investigating because some of the 
information was harmful is likewise an insufficient reason to cease the investigation. 
Hutchison v. State, 150 S.W.3d 292 (Mo. 2004)(trial court erred in ruling that further 
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investigation into mental health claims was unnecessary because some of the information 
might have been harmful); Wiggins, at 2537 (counsel must conduct a reasonable 
investigation and pursue known leads regarding mitigation in order to make informed 
choices about possible defenses). 
D. Failure to Present the Mitigation Evidence was Prejudicial 
The failure to discover and present evidence of brain injury and other mitigation is 
prejudicial. Tenard, at 2569-70. The trial court's finding that Mr. Taylor must first 
establish a nexus between brain injury before that can be used in mitigation is erroneous 
and has no basis in law. Tenard, at 2569-70 (the Court rejects nexus test as having "no 
foundation in the decisions of this Court.");26 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 822 
(1991) ("we have held that a state cannot preclude the sentencer from considering any 
relevant mitigating evidence that the defendant proffers in support of a sentence less than 
death. Virtually no limits are placed on the relevant mitigating evidence a capital 
defendant may introduce concerning his own circumstances."); Skipper v. South 
Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 5 (1986) (The trial court's exclusion from the sentencing hearing of 
the testimony of the jailers and the visitor denied petitioner his right to place before the 
sentencing jury all relevant evidence in mitigation of punishment); Eddings v. Oklahoma 
455 U.S. 104 (1982) (death sentence vacated when state court refused to consider as 
26
 The trial court was informed of the ruling in Tenard v. Dretke before signing the 
order granting summary judgment. The trial court, however, ignored that precedent 
instead finding petitioner's objections "to be inappropriate." Post-Conviction R. 1970. 
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mitigating circumstance the petitioner's unhappy childhood and emotional disturbance, 
including evidence of turbulent family history and beatings by a harsh father); Lockett v. 
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,604(1978) 
In this case, petitioner has shown that there is "a 'reasonable probability that, 
absent the errors, the sentencer . . . . would have concluded that the balance of 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant deathr Battenfield, 236 F.3d at 
1226 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 695). There is a plethora of 
compelling mitigation evidence that was available in 1991, but was neither discovered 
nor presented. The evidence here is more compelling than any of the evidence discovered 
in the post-conviction cases outlined above. Compare Williams, 529 U.S. at 399 (failure 
to investigate or present evidence of Williams' background, abuse at hands of father, 
borderline mental retardation, or to interview witnesses about Williams' background and 
history "raised a reasonable probability that the result of the sentencing hearing would 
have been different if competent counsel had presented and explained the significance of 
all the available evidence."); Caro, 280 F.3d at 1249-50 (failure "to investigate and 
present evidence of the impact that exposure to neurotoxicants and child abuse had on his 
brain" constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel); Battenfield, 236 F.3d at 1234 ("[Trial 
counsel] failed to conduct a constitutionally adequate pretrial investigation into potential 
mitigation evidence which, in turn, hampered his ability to make strategic choices 
regarding the second-stage proceedings and competently advise his client regarding those 
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proceedings."); Brownlee v. Haley, 306 F.3d 1043,1068 (11th Cir. 2002) (trial counsel 
"failed to conduct any kind of substantive investigation into [defendant's] background or 
character for purposes of presenting potentially mitigating evidence at sentencing until 
after the jury rendered it's advisory verdict, and that such constituted deficient 
performance within the meaning of Strickland), 
The trial court's finding that failure to present the compelling mitigation was 
strategic has been squarely rejected by the United States Appellate Courts. Smith, at 943 
(The Tenth Circuit noted that trial court erroneously concluded that the mitigation 
evidence of brain damage evidenced by lack of impulse control was aggravating. This 
conclusion "reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of the purpose for which such 
mitigation evidence would have been presented."); Williams, 529 U.S. at 369 (nice boy 
image argument is not a substitute for mitigation evidence of abuse at hands of father, 
borderline mental retardation, and failure to interview witnesses about Williams good 
character); Battenfield, 236 F.3d at 1229 ("[Trial counsel's] failure to investigate 
Battenfield's background, and his failure to explore other readily apparent mitigation 
possibilities, rendered unreasonable his alleged penalty-phase strategy of focusing on 
sympathy and mercy.") 
The chief problem with the trial court's analysis is the failure to address the 
incomplete nature of the mitigation investigation and the importance of a complete 
investigation in making strategic choices. Seee.g., Battenfield, 236 F.3d at 1226 (ignoring 
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prior evidence of head injury, substance abuse problem, history of substance abuse in 
family, and evidence from family and friends that defendant was known for compassion, 
gentleness, and lack of violence is ineffective even though counsel argued for mercy and 
compassion). 
If the known mitigation evidence were presented in this case, the result would have 
been different. Prior to 1989, Mr. Taylor had no prior criminal history and was generally 
known as a non-violent and compassionate person. His siblings would have testified 
about his lack of prior violence, gentleness, and how he avoided conflict as a child. Post-
Conviction R. 1400-08; See Battenfield, 236 F.3d at (trial counsel ineffective for failing 
to present evidence from family and friends that defendant was known for compassion, 
gentleness, and lack of violence, even when provoked). The known evidence of brain 
injury, however, is perhaps the most compelling mitigation evidence. Here, Levine never 
even argued that any of the two powerful statutory mitigating circumstances existed.27 
The two that did exist here-the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance and the defendant failed to conform his conduct to the requirement 
of law or appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions as a result of a mental disease or 
defect-are alone sufficient to tip any balance in favor of life over death. Caro, at 1258 
("Because it has been established that Caro suffers from brain damage, the delicate 
27
 On the contrary, trial counsel wrongly and continually emphasized to the jury 
that Mr. Taylor had no mental health problems. 
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balance between his moral capability and the value of his life would certainly teeter 
toward life."); Brownlee, 306 F.3d at 1073-74 ("our confidence in the jury's balancing of 
the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and it's resulting recommendation of death 
has been substantially undermined as a result of counsel's failure to present to the jury of 
any of the powerful [mental health] mitigating evidence that was available."). 
Other evidence shows that Mr. Taylor was the minor participant both in terms of 
playing a lesser role in the offense and because the co-defendant was the leader. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-207(section addressing minor participant); Osborn v. Shillinger, 861 
F.2d 612 (10th Cir. 1988) (Trial counsel's failure to adequately investigate his client's 
potential lesser role compared to the co-defendant's is one of the bases for reversing 
death sentence); Post-Conviction R. 1400-06. His family members would provide potent 
evidence that Von was easily lead and manipulated from an early age up until the time of 
the homicide. Indeed, in the days before the homicide, Steven Taylor, Von's brother 
observed both Von and co-defendant Deli. Steven would have testified that Edward Deli 
was the person making all the plans for where the two would go, how they would obtain 
money, and what they would do. See Cilwick Affidavit. Steven observed Von listening 
and merely going along with the things said by Deli. 
Steven's observations were confirmed by Linae Tiede who told police that Deli, 
was in charge or the "bossy one," and that Von did everything. This is consistent with his 
life history of being easily manipulated and following behind a more dominant person-the 
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very type of evidence that would have been presented had trial counsel interviewed Mr. 
Taylor's siblings. This is the type of statutory mitigating evidence that should have been 
presented at the penalty phase. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207 (2)(c)(1990)(the 
defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another 
person). Presentation of this evidence would tip the scales in favor of life. 
IV. THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS WERE ERRONEOUS IN THAT THEY 
WERE UNFAIRLY WEIGHTED TOWARD DEATH, THE REASONABLE 
DOUBT INSTRUCTION VIOLATES DUE PROCESS, AND THE FAILURE 
TO GIVE SEVERAL INSTRUCTIONS PROPOSED BY MR. TAYLOR 
WAS PREJUDICIAL 
A. Jury Instructions 
The jury instructions are found in the court record at pages 196 to 230. The 
reasonable doubt instruction is instruction No. 10, pages 206-07 . The instructions that 
are unconstitutionally and unfairly weighted toward death are found in instructions Nos. 
10 to 27, pages 205-224 . The special verdict instruction, asking the jury to count and 
score the aggravating circumstances, is attached to the numbered jury instructions 
contained in the record at pages 226 and 227. The mitigation instruction is instruction 
No. 12 at page 208. Taylor's proposed mitigation instruction appears on page 149, the 
proposed life sentence instruction appears at page 155. 
The proposed jury instructions submitted by trial counsel appear in the record at 
pages 143 to 155. The proposed instruction regarding the mitigating circumstances (R. 
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149) sets out circumstances that the jury may consider. The court's instruction (R. 208), 
however, suggests that the jury must make a specific finding regarding the existence of 
the mitigating factor, before it can count it as a mitigating factor. The proposed 
instruction instructs the jury "that it may consider as mitigating circumstances the 
following: . . ." (R. 149), and then it lists the statutory mitigating factors. The given 
instruction, however, is styled in form of "whether" the particular mitigating factor exists. 
For example the proposed instruction reads: 
The jury is instructed that it may consider as mitigating circumstances the 
following: 
1. The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity: 
The given instruction reads: 
In considering mitigating circumstances, you may consider the following factors 
which may or may not be present: 
1. Whether the defendant's history of prior criminal history is insignificant: 
The proposed instruction is simpler, more easily understood, and more accurately 
states the purpose of mitigating circumstances. 
B. Improper Burden Shifting- Unfairly Weighted Toward Aggravation-
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Failure to Narrow. 
Instruction number 10 addresses the standard for the jury to follow in weighing 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. (Instruction No. 10 is attached to the First 
Amended Petition as Exhibit 15). That instruction states that factors in aggravation and 
mitigation should be considered "in terms of their respective substantiality and 
persuasiveness/' suggesting that mere numbers of aggravating factors tip the balance in 
favor of death. The instruction further instructs the jury "to consider the totality of 
evidence .. . produced by the defendant throughout the penalty phase . . . ," suggesting 
that the Taylor had a burden to produce evidence that outweighed the evidence produced 
by the state. This instruction is inconsistent with Utah penalty phase standards. State v. 
Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 83 (Utah 1982)(setting forth two-part test: 1. aggravating 
circumstances must outweigh mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, and 2. 
imposition of the death penalty is justified and appropriate under the circumstances 
beyond a reasonable doubt) 
The error in that instruction is compounded by the failure of the trial court to give 
the presumption of life instruction proposed by Taylor, Trial R. 154, the overwhelming 
number of jury instructions addressing aggravating factors, and jury instruction number 
27 which contains no provision for consideration of a life sentence. R. 224. Moreover, 
the ineffectiveness of trial counsel in failing to conduct adequate investigation of 
mitigating factors, or to present or argue mitigating factors lead to imposition of the death 
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penalty here.28 Finally, the prosecutor told the jury during closing that the state did not to 
prove the listed aggravating circumstances to return a verdict of death. See Claim 
Twenty-Three In First Amended Petition and Argument Below. 
Indeed, the vast number of instructions addressing aggravating circumstances, 
along with the special verdict aggravator checklist, unfairly weighted the aggravating 
factors against Taylor and in favor of a death verdict. 
C. Reasonable Doubt. 
The reasonable doubt instruction is part of Instruction No. 10. That instruction 
neither adequately explains nor legally describes the reasonable doubt standard. See Cage 
v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990); State v. Reyes, — P.3d — WL 1330791 (Utah 2005) 
D. Presumption of Life. 
28
 As the Supreme Court noted, Levine's closing argument was "not a model of 
persuasive rhetoric:" 
Levine began by telling a Native American story about how death came into the 
world but then failed to connect the story to his argument. Levine never asked the 
jury directly to spare his client's life although he did say that 'the killing has to 
stop somewhere.' He told the jurors that balancing mitigating and aggravating 
factors meaningfully was extremely difficult if not impossible but that they had to 
do it anyway. He emphasized that Taylor himself thought his own crimes were 
'gross' and 'vile.' He repeatedly reminded the jury that Taylor, like criminals 
generally, did not think like 'you and I.' He mentioned, but did not elaborate on, 
the only mitigating factors he had, i.e., Taylor's relative youth and clean record. 
Overall, Levine did not give a virtuoso performance. 
Taylor, 947 P.2d at 688. 
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Trial counsel proposed an instruction that read: 
All presumptions of law, independent of evidence, are in favor of life 
imprisonment until and unless you as jurors, after considering the totality of the 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, are persuaded beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the total aggravation outweighs total mitigation and, you are further 
persuaded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the imposition of the death penalty is 
justified and appropriate under the circumstances. 
R. 154 (A copy of that instruction is attached as Exhibit 16 to the First Amended 
Petition). 
A note appears at the bottom of the instruction reading "not given-fGN-5-21-91." 
This is a proper statement of Utah law and a jury instruction approved by the Utah 
Supreme Court. State v. Holland, 876 P.2d 357 (Utah 1994). There is no explanation for 
excluding that instruction and no record of trial counsel's exception or objection to the 
failure to give that instruction. 
E. Life Sentence Instruction. 
Trial counsel proposed an instruction which read: 
Life imprisonment means that the defendant will be incarcerated in the Utah State 
Prison for the remainder of his natural life, unless and if ever, he is paroled by the 
Board of Pardons. 
R. 155 (A copy of that Instruction is attached as Exhibit 17 to the First Amended 
Petition). 
A note at the bottom of that instruction reads "given fGN" which is crossed out. 
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Below the crossed out section it reads, "withdrawn fGN 5-21-91." This was a proper 
statement of law in 1991. It was particularly important given the prosecutor's argument 
that Mr. Taylor might escape from prison and constitutes a continuing danger while in 
prison. See generally Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994) (defendant was 
denied due process when trial court refused to instruct sentencing jury that life sentence 
meant no possibility of parole). This instruction would have mitigated the prosecution's 
argument regarding possibility of escape and accurately explained to the jury the meaning 
of a life sentence. 
F. No Option for Consideration of Life. 
Instruction No. 27 (attached as Exhibit 18 to the First Amended Petition) fails to 
instruct the jury that life is an option. Rather the instruction gives the jury two options: 1. 
A unanimous finding for death; or 2. A non-unanimous finding of death. This instruction 
tells the jury that the only deliberation or debate in this case is for death. It fails to 
instruct that life is an appropriate option or an appropriate topic for debate during 
deliberation. The sole option given to the jury was for death or for non-unanimous death 
if the jury was "reasonably satisfied that [they] will not reach a unanimous verdict of 
death." The life option is erroneously absent from the instruction. 
Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the jury instructions at the 
penalty phase. Trial TR, 826. Although trial counsel submitted proposed instructions 
addressing mitigation, presumption of life, and the meaning of life in prison, there is no 
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explanation for why he failed to take exceptions or object to the failure to give his 
proposed instructions. The court states that the parties "had an opportunity to discuss jury 
instructions and verdict forms, etc., in chambers. . . ," and then asked both trial counsel 
and the state if either had "exceptions or objections to the jury instructions, the special 
interrogatories or the verdict form." Trial Transcript, 826. Inexplicably, trial counsel 
stated, "No, your honor. I'm satisfied with the jury instructions the court is going to 
give." Id. 826. Trial counsel's only objection related to the court's restrictions to the 
testimony of death row inmate Holland.29 Trial TR. 826 
This error was critical given the paucity of trial counsel's argument and failure to 
ask the jury to spare Taylor's life. Moreover the error was compounded by Levine's 
failure to conduct any meaningful mitigation investigation or to object to any of the 
highly prejudicial evidence admitted by the prosecution at the penalty phase. See 
Argument Below Regarding Admission of Manley Tape, Prosecution Misconduct and 
"Grossness Measurement" evidence presented by Jim Bell. The combination of trial 
counsel's lack of investigation, failure to present mitigation, and the erroneous 
instructions weighted in favor of death was prejudicial to Mr. Taylor. 
As the record shows, trial counsel did not object to either the instructions given or 
argued for inclusion of the instructions he submitted to the court. Trial counsel did, 
29
 The Utah Supreme Court condemned Levine's attempt to call Holland as a 
witness at Mr. Taylor's trial. 
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however, in his opening brief, raise the claim that the penalty phase jury instructions 
"were unconstitutional in that they either relieved the state of its burden of proof or, in the 
alternative, lessened the state's burden of proof." He argued that the instructions as 
written created an unlawful rebuttable presumption. He offers no explanation for failing 
to object at trial and instead asks the Supreme Court to "still consider these issues and 
make appropriate rulings on these issues, especially since this a capital homicide case." 
Unfortunately, this opening brief was withdrawn upon motion of the state. 
There is no indication anywhere in the several hundred pages of the Rule 23B 
hearing or in the Rule 23B pleadings that appellate counsel even looked at the jury 
instructions for error. There are no questions asked of trial counsel regarding proposed 
instructions, why no objections were posed to the court's failure to give the presumption 
of life or explanation of life sentence instructions. There is no inquiry or discovery 
conducted regarding why the life sentence explanation instruction was withdrawn. 
Moreover, there is no mention in the voluminous record as to why the jury could only 
consider death and non-unanimous death in its deliberations. See Instruction No. 27. In 
short, there has been no prior judicial review of this issue. A minimally competent capital 
attorney should have discovered these errors, addressed these errors, and raised these 
matters before the trial court and Utah Supreme Court. 
Rule 23B counsel was equally ineffective in failing to review the instructions for 
error or for reviewing the instructions and concluding there was no error. The failure to 
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properly instruct the jury had a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict as to render 
the sentence in this case unfair and unconstitutional. But for these errors with the jury 
instructions, Mr. Taylor would have received a sentence less than death. This error was 
not harmless. 
V. THE VOIR DIRE WAS INADEQUATE TO ENSURE A FAIR & 
IMPARTIAL JURY - CLAIMS 14 & 15 
A. Purpose of the Voir Dire Process 
Voir dire process serves two purposes: (1) to detect bias in jurors; and (2) "the 
collection of data to permit informed exercise of peremptory challenges." State v. Taylor, 
664 P.2d 439, 447 (Utah 1983); State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839 (Utah 1988); State v. 
Saunders, 992 P.2d 951, 961 (Utah 1999). "Voir dire questioning is essential to choosing 
an impartial jury, and an impartial jury is as essential to a fair trial as is an impartial 
judge." Saunders, 992 P.2d at 961. Although a trial judge has discretion in limiting voir 
dire, "that discretion must be 'liberally exercised5 in favor of allowing counsel to elicit 
necessary information for ferreting out bias, whether for a for-cause challenge or a 
peremptory challenge." Id. (quoting Worthen, 765 P.2d at 845)(emphasis in original). 
In a death penalty case, the jurors must be asked questions about their views of the 
death penalty. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 
U.S. 510 (1968); State v. Kell, 61 P.3d 1019,1027 (Utah 2002). Jurors, who state in voir 
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dire, that they would automatically impose the death penalty and those who would never 
impose death are both subject to removal for cause. See Witherspoon, 391 U.S. 510. 
Accordingly, the court's voir dire examination should be broadly exercised in favor of 
exploring the juror's viewpoints on the death penalty. 
B. Lack of Voir Dire in This Case 
In this case, trial counsel neither prepared nor submitted for consideration 
proposed voir dire questions either addressing guilt/innocence issues or penalty phase 
issues. He apparently either relied upon the state attorneys' or the court's questioning as 
sufficient. Neither he nor appellate counsel raised any objections to the voir dire process, 
and those matters were never addressed by the Utah Supreme Court. Both trial counsel 
and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to raise the issues identified in claims 
14 and 15 in the First Amended Petition. Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106(2)(this issue 
could have been was not raised on appeal). 
The court unconstitutionally limited the scope of voir dire by preventing trial 
counsel from asking whether the jurors felt that it was their job to seek revenge for what 
Mr. Taylor had done. This was a particularly appropriate voir dire question given that a 
jury earlier that week acquitted co-defendant Deli of the capital murder charge and 
convicted him of a lesser-included offense.30 See Saunders, 992 P.2d at 962 (Trial counsel 
30
 Trial counsel felt it important to ask this questions because he heard 
"[r]umblings [around the courthouse] that Mr. Deli got off, and [people] couldn't 
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should be given considerable latitude in asking voir dire questions, chiefly because trial 
counsel is more likely to know the case better then the court). 
The court also erred in preventing trial counsel from asking the jurors if they felt 
that life in prison was more severe than death or whether death is more severe than life in 
prison. 
A comparison between a life sentence and death is a particularly relevant and 
important consideration in a death penalty case, since the only two juror options were life 
and death. The court stated no basis for refusing to allow trial counsel to ask these 
questions, and for sustaining the state's objections to these questions. The failure to 
allow those questions in this case was prejudicial, as none of the jurors were allowed to 
state their views of life versus death, preventing counsel from intelligently exercising his 
peremptory challenges. All trial counsel had in this case, was death-qualified jurors, 
without any knowledge of those jurors who might generally favor life over death. See 
Saunders, 992 P.2d at 965 (limitations on voir-dire combined with the refusal to remove 
for cause challenged juror were sufficiently cumulative to constitute reversible error); 
Witherspoon, 391 U.S. 510 (those who express general objections to the death penalty 
cannot be excluded for cause). 
VI. SEVERAL JURORS DID NOT MEET CONSTITUTIONAL 
STANDARDS OF IMPARTIALITY 
understand why he got off." Rule 23B TR.2392. 
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A. Standards For Failing to Remove Juror for Cause 
A "petitioner must rebut the strong presumption that under the circumstances, the 
challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy." Carter III, 44 P.3d at 638. 
A petitioner must overcome two presumptions: 1. that counsel's decision not to challenge 
a particular juror is presumed to be a conscious choice; and 2. counsel's strategic choice 
to refrain from objecting to a juror is presumed to constitute effective assistance. 
Carterlll, at 638. Additionally, the court will find error if a petitioner can demonstrate 
one of the following three elements: 
(1) Defense counsel was so inattentive or indifferent during the jury selection that 
the failure to remove a prospective juror was not the product of a conscious choice 
or preference; 
(2) A prospective juror express bias so strong or unequivocal that no plausible 
counterveiling subjective preference could justify failure to remove that juror; or 
(3) There is some other specific evidence clearly demonstrating that counsel's 
choice was not plausibly justified. 
Carterffl, at 638-39. 
At least four jurors who sat on the jury in this case expressed bias so strong or 
unequivocal that no plausible counterveiling subjective preference could justify failure to 
remove that juror or trial counsel's choice in not asking that those jurors be removed was 
not plausible. Moreover, the failure to remove those jurors demonstrates that trial counsel 
was so inattentive or indifferent that it was not the product of conscious choice or 
preference. 
Those jurors were David Richards, Blaine Moore, Joseph Jenkins, and Cheryl 
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Chamberlain. Juror David Richards had an attorney client relationship with County 
Attorney, Bob Adkins. Trial TR, 59,31 The extent of that relationship was unknown since 
no one asked follow up questions or probed the extent or depth of the relationship.32 The 
court simply asked whether juror Richards could still be "fair and impartial" despite that 
relationship. See Saunders, at 962 (Juror's statement he or she can be fair insufficient to 
qualify juror once answers suggesting bias are raised. Court must ask questions to 
explore possible bias). 
Juror Blaine Moore worked with prosecutor Bob Adkins' mother at the LDS 
Temple. Vol. II, TR. 53-54. Moore should have been excluded pursuant to Witherspoon 
v. Illinois, as he expressed his belief in the doctrine of blood atonement acknowledging 
that "anyone who kills must also be killed." Vol. II, TR, 250. The court attempted 
rehabilitation by telling him that the "[LDS] Church does not accept the doctrine of blood 
atonement," id. 250, and whether he "understand[s] that the [LDS] Church does not teach 
[the doctrine of blood atonement]." Id. 250. Moore additionally expressed frustration at 
housing "guilty" people in jail at taxpayer expense, id. 251, and doesn't "think that's 
right." When asked if he was more inclined to impose the death penalty because Mr. 
Taylor "admitted to killing two individuals with a gun in an unprovoked manner," Moore 
31
 The prosecution struck potential juror Philip Ovard who was a party opponent of 
Mr. Adkins in an earlier property transaction. Trial TR. 290, R. 126. 
32
 The prosecutor certainly knew the extent, scope, and nature of the relationship, 
but disclosed none of that information to the court. 
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suggested that death was appropriate. Trial TR. 253. 
Trial counsel appropriately moved to challenge Moore for cause "based upon his 
answers." Trial TR. 254. Levine appropriately noted that Moore believed in the doctrine 
of blood atonement and that based upon the general tenor and demeanor of his answers 
could not be a "fair and impartial juror." Id. The court denied the challenge. Id. 254. 
Mr. Moore should have been removed for cause. Trial counsel's failure to remove Moore 
is inexplicable given Moore's preference for imposing the death penalty in facts similar to 
this case. Moore is the type of juror who expresses "bias so strong or unequivocal that no 
plausible counterveiling subjective preference could justify failure to remove that juror." 
Carter, at 638-39. 
Joseph Jenkins, who was then director of the Summit County Health Department, 
told the court he was a "lifelong friend" of prosecutor Bob Adkins and worked with 
prosecutors Adkins and Christiansen in the county office building. Vol. II, TR. 44. He 
had an existing attorney/client relationship with both Mr. Adkins and Mr. Christiansen. 
Trial Tr. 44. Despite this apparent attorney/client relationship, neither the court nor 
Levine asked any follow up questions or sought to probe the extent of that relationship.33 
Mr. Jenkins should have been removed for cause. It is again inexplicable why trial 
counsel choose to retain both prosecutors' client. 
33
 The prosecutors again failed to volunteer any information about the nature of 
existing attorney/client relationship. 
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Juror Cheryl Chamberlain was Judge Edward Watson's cousin,34 and her son was 
married to prosecutor Bob Adkins' sister. Trial TR. 113. Despite her disclosure of these 
relationships, no one asked her to further elaborate, especially the relationship between 
her and Mr. Adkins. No challenge for cause was made to remove Ms. Chamberlain. Ms. 
Chamberlain sat on the jury that returned a verdict of death. 
It is hard to imagine a jury more prone to accepting the prosecutor's argument for 
death. Two of the prosecutor's clients sat on the jury. Another juror, who strongly 
believed in the doctrine of blood atonement and worked with prosecutor's mother, also 
sat. The fourth juror was directly related to the prosecutor's sister. One-quarter of the 
jury in this case was biased and should have been removed for cause. This error is not 
harmless. Absent this error Mr. Taylor would have received a more favorable result. 
There was also prejudice in failing to challenge for cause potential juror Wilde 
who explained he was a member of the LDS Church and believed in the doctrine of blood 
atonement acknowledging "that if somebody kills somebody, they should pay with their 
own life." Trial TR. 270. The court emphasized to Mr. Wilde that the LDS Church 
neither "teach[es]" nor "accept[s]" that doctrine. Id. Despite that admonition, Mr. Wilde 
told the court that he had formed an opinion based upon what he heard and that was for 
death. Id. 272. Trial counsel did not challenge juror Wilde for cause, but used a 
peremptory challenge to strike him. 
34
 Judge Watson heard the preliminary hearing in this case. 
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Potential juror McNeil witnessed the police chase in this case, Vol. II, TR, 305, 
which was ultimately presented and argued as an aggravating circumstance. She 
expressed concern about her ability to be impartial based upon her observations. Id. The 
court, incorrectly, told her that because Mr. Taylor pled guilty she would "not be asked to 
judge whether or not it happened." Id. This was incorrect because Ms. McNeil, if chosen 
as a juror, would have to decide if Mr. Taylor committed the offense of fleeing, the very 
offense to which Ms. McNeil was a witness. Moreover, because she observed the car 
chase and lived close to the Tiede cabin, Ms. McNeil told the court she was "fairly 
biased," against Mr. Taylor, id. 306, and did not think "that life in prison would be as 
severe a sentence as the death penalty." Id. 308. Trial counsel moved to strike Ms. 
McNeil for cause. Id. 310. The judge denied the challenge id. 311; trial counsel struck 
Ms. McNeil with the use of a peremptory challenge. R. 126. 
During voir dire, potential juror Dearl Shill stated that he didn't think that life in 
prison was a severe sentence. Vol. II, TR. 354. When trial counsel attempted a follow up 
question-whether Mr. Shill feels that life in prison is an appropriate penalty based on Mr. 
Taylor's admission of guilt— the court interceded stating, "I won't let you ask that that 
way." Id. Later, trial counsel moved to strike Shill for cause, a challenge which was 
denied. Vol. II, TR. 356-57. Trial counsel later used a peremptory challenge to strike 
juror Shill. R. 126. 
Juror Blum told the court that a lack of mental health or psychiatric evidence 
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would have " substantial bearing on [her] decision . . . " to impose death. Vol. II, TR. 
321-22. In fact, she acknowledge that the lack of mental health evidence would "sway" 
her more toward the death penalty. Id. Despite these answers, trial counsel did not move 
to strike her for cause. Ms. Blum was removed from the jury by the prosecutor's use of a 
peremptory challenge. R. 127. 
Alternate juror Dennis Gunn knew prosecutor Adkins from "being a lifelong 
resident" of the county. Vol.. II, TR. 64. Moreover, Gunn acknowledged that he had a 
previous attorney/client relationship with Mr. Adkins, occurring two years before this 
case. Id. No one asked Mr. Gunn about the basis of that representation. 
Failure to strike these additional jurors was prejudicial to Mr. Taylor. Rule 23B 
counsel neither addressed jury issues nor raised any of those issues in the course of the 
Rule 23B hearing. His failure to raise these important issues is ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
VII. THE TRIAL ERRED IN FAILING TO STAY BOTH THE TRIAL AND 
RULE 23B HEARING TO DETERMINE MR. TAYLOR'S COMPETENCY 
TO PROCEED. CLAIM 21. 
A. The Competency Statute 
When there is a bonafide doubt as to defendant's competency, a court is required 
to initiate competency proceedings and hold a competency hearing. State v. Lafferty, 20 
P.3d 342, 361 (Utah 2001); Utah Code Ann. §77-15-5(l)(1990) see Smith, 370 F.3d at 
930 . Those proceedings include appointment of two or more alienists, preparation of 
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reports, and the setting of a hearing. Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-5. After the receipt of 
reports, the court is not authorized to set a hearing until at least five days after the parties 
receive copies of the reports. Id. "All other proceedings pending against the defendant 
shall be stayed until the proceedings to determine his mental condition are terminated." 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-5(7) (1990). 
There are two types of competency claims: 1. Procedural claims that arise when 
trial court either fails to hold a competency hearing or fails to hold an adequate 
competency hearing. Smith, 379 F.3d at 930; and 2. Substantive claims that arise when 
"an individual was tried and convicted while, in fact, incompetent." Id. "[T]o prevail on 
a procedural competency claim after a trial in which a petitioner was found competent 
under an unconstitutional burden of proof, the petitioner must establish that a reasonable 
judge should have had a bona fide doubt as to his competence at the time of trial." Id. A 
petitioner establishes a bona fide doubt if he shows that a reasonable judge should have 
doubted whether petitioner had "' sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with 
a reasonable degree of rational understanding' and whether petitioner had 'a rational as 
well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.,f Id, quoting Dusky v. 
United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402, (1960). A defendant must be competent throughout the 
entire trial. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-72 (1975), McGregor v. Gibson, 
248 F.3d 946, 954 (10th Cir. 2001). 
A person making a procedural incompetence claim "need not establish facts 
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sufficient to show he was actually incompetent or to show he was incompetent by a 
preponderance of the evidence." Id. Rather, courts look at "evidence of... irrational 
behavior,... demeanor at trial, and any prior medical opinion" to determine whether 
further inquiry on the part of the trial judge was required. Smith, at 930 {quoting Drope, 
420 U.S. at 180, 95 S.Ct. 896). "[E]vidence of mental illness and any representations of 
defense counsel about the defendant's incompetence" would also be significant. Id. 
(quoting Walker v. Gibson, 228 F.3d 1217, 1227 (10th Cir.2000)). "We examine the 
totality of the circumstances.... The question is ... whether the trial court Tail[ed] to give 
proper weight to the information suggesting incompetence which came to light during 
trial.'" Id. at 955 (quoting Drope, 420 U.S. at 179, 95 S.Ct. 896). 
B. Competency Issues at the Penalty Phase. 
On the opening morning of the penalty phase, Mr. Taylor attempted suicide by 
slitting his wrists. These injuries required medical treatment and stitches. Trial TR, 30. 
The trial was delayed as the parties were appropriately concerned about Mr. Taylor's 
competency to proceed. The court meanwhile contacted Dr. Mark Rindflesh, a Salt Lake 
City psychiatrist, to examine Mr. Taylor. Dr. Rindflesh was the same doctor who filed a 
report stating that Mr. Taylor had no history of counseling or therapy from mental health 
professionals, "no history of mental illness," and no "psychiatric problems," all 
conclusions plainly contrary to known evidence existing in early 1991. 
The court was properly concerned "as to whether or not Mr. Taylor [was] 
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competent to proceed with the penalty phase of this trial." Trial TR. 27. Dr. Rindflesh 
spoke briefly with Mr. Taylor, concluding he was competent to proceed. Id. 28. There is 
no indication that he conducted any psychological or psychiatric tests and he prepared no 
reports. Dr. Rindflesh felt that Mr. Taylor suffered from depression, that could possibly 
be treated with medication. Trial TR, 31. This procedure did not comport with the 
statutory requirements for competency determination. 
Here the court failed to give proper weight to the information suggesting 
incompetence. Even Dr. Rindflesh expressed reservations about Mr. Taylor's mental 
health by suggesting that anti-depressant medication may allow him to save up a supply 
for a future suicide attempt. The court should have ordered a competency evaluation in 
light of Mr. Taylor's prior mental heath history, prior suicide attempts and serious suicide 
attempt on the morning of the penalty phase. Here, the trial court ffail[ed] to give proper 
weight to the information suggesting incompetence. Smith, at 955. 
C. Rule 23B Competency Issues. 
At the Rule 23B hearing, appellate counsel again raised the issue of Mr. Taylor's 
competency. He described Von as "either in some sort or depression or remorse or 
something. His eyes are teary, he's crying and he is - although he's responsive to my 
questions in the sense of being oriented as to time and space, he is answering questions by 
telling me about personal feelings instead of being responsive to the questions that I'm 
asking." Rule 23B, 5, 2178. These observations were confirmed by appellate counsel's 
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assistant. Rule 23B, Vol. Ill, 5, 6, 2178. Mr. Taylor responded to questions: "I'm too 
depressed. I'm too depressed. I can't do this anymore." Rule 23B, Vol. Ill, 6. Appellate 
counsel further indicated that Mr. Taylor's conduct is "totally and completely . . . [a] 
surprise." (Vol. Ill, 9, 2182). Appellate counsel expressed grave concerns about his 
competency to proceed further in the hearing: 
If Mr. Taylor is emotionally of the state that it is certainly that I'm observing -
again, I am not holding myself out as any kind of an expert here - but if his 
emotional depression is such that he, after all of this, is willing to risk the motion 
of the state to pull this entire thing back, I want him examined by somebody. 
Rule 23B, 2186. 
During same conversation, Mr. Taylor seems confused about his options regarding 
the Rule 23(b) hearing and the appeal (Rule 23B, Vol. Ill, 17, 2190): 
Q: [Mr.Voros]: Does he understand that he has an appeal even if he doesn't have 
his 23(b)? 
A: [Mr. Savage]: I don't know what he understands. That's why I said: "Do I ask 
him" - is what you are telling me, you want to back out, not do this and just have 
me do things at the Supreme Court, "yes" or "no?" The answer I got, however was 
not "yes" or "no"; and so as I've indicated, I didn't feel like I could proceed in any 
direction. Vol. Ill, 17,R.2190 
At one point during the colloquy, Mr. Taylor did not respond to the Judge's 
question and instead turned toward appellate counsel. Vol. Ill, 30-31, R.2203-04. 
Appellate counsel unequivocally moved to have Mr. Taylor evaluated for competency. 
Rule 23B, 45-47. The court denied the motion finding ruling that a Rule 23B hearing was 
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not a proceeding contemplated by §77-15-5 and that defendant did not have a right to 
raise a competency claim under that provision. Rule 23B, 50-52. The trial court not only 
failed to give proper weight to the evidence, it simply ignored the evidence by claiming 
that a capital defendant never has the right to raise competency claims at a Rule 23B 
remand to determine ineffective assistance. This is clear error. 
Although both trial counsel and Rule 23B counsel raised the issue at the trial court 
level, neither raised that issue on appeal and this court should review the error applying 
the unusual circumstance test. A minimally competent capital attorney would have 
requested a continuance and requested more comprehensive mental health examination 
aimed at determining competency. Indeed, the state statute in effect at the time called for 
examinations by two or more alienists to determine competency. It also called for a stay 
in all pending court proceedings. Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-4 (1990). The informal 
discussion with Mr. Taylor was simply insufficient to determine, with any degree of 
accuracy, Mr. Taylor's competency. Had this been done is reasonably probable that Mr. 
Taylor would have received a sentence other than death, especially in light of the mental 
heath issues known today. Trial counsel's failure to move for a continuance substantially 
and injuriously affected the process to such an extent as to render Mr. Taylor's death 
sentence fundamentally unfair and unconstitutional. This error was not harmless. 
Likewise, appellate counsel's failure to raise the penalty phase and Rule 23B 
competency claims was error. In this instance, appellate counsel described a situation 
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wherein Mr. Taylor could not "assist his counsel in his defense." Utah Code Ann. § 77-
15-2(2). To proceed forward under these circumstances, especially when the trial court 
wrongly declared that competency is never an issue at a Rule 23B hearing, is plain error. 
VIIL THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE HEARSAY 
STATEMENT OF SCOTT MANLEY 
A. The Manley Tape 
After Von Taylor's arrest, police contacted parole officer Cathy Truelson who 
supervised Mr. Taylor at the Orange Street half-way house. See Detective Offret Police 
Report, Post-Conviction R. 763 She immediately told police that Mr. Manley might 
somehow be involved in the incident that occurred at the Tiede cabin either because he 
was with Mr. Taylor or might have provided the firearm to Mr. Taylor. The police later 
interviewed Mr. Manley. Id. When interviewed by police on December 26, 1990, 
Manley was also suspected of a parole violation for possessing a .357 Magnum pistol. 
Post-Conviction R. 1641-46.35 The incident involving possession of the gun occurred on 
November 18, 1990, approximately five weeks before the incident at the Tiede cabin. 
35
 The government objected to the supplementation of the record with the Manley 
probation and police reports. The state does not object to the accuracy of the records; 
rather they make a procedural objection claiming prejudice in their ability to respond to 
the motion for summary judgment. The records were offered simply as background 
information relating to witness Scott Manley. As explained in the pleading, although the 
records were received by the mitigation specialist in 1998, those records were not 
delivered to counsel until 2003. The state was not prejudiced by supplementation of the 
records. Mr. Taylor contends it was error for the trial court to strike the reports from the 
record. 
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The supplemental records simply relate to Manley's criminal background, the bias 
he showed in offering testimony against Mr. Taylor, and his actions which cast doubt on 
his statements. 
B. The Statement was Inadmissible 
To be admissible at a penalty phase, evidence must be reliable. State v. Brown, 
607 P.2d 261, 271 (Utah 1980). The court must act as a vigilant gatekeeper to insure that 
prejudicial or otherwise unreliable evidence is not presented to the trier of fact in a capital 
case: 
Scrupulous care must be exercised by the state in capital cases in both the guilt 
determination and penalty phases in presentation of evidence and argument 
because of the acknowledged uniqueness of the death penalty. 
5r0wi,6O7P.2dat271. 
The sentencing hearing in a death penalty case must further satisfy the 
requirements of due process. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977). Courts must 
ensure that evidence presented in the penalty phase of death case is reliable. See Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 192 (1976); State v. Brown, 607 P.2d at 271 (court found 
prejudicial error in admission of hearsay at penalty phase); United States v. Gilbert, 120 
F. Supp. 3d 147 (D. Mass. 2000)(some information, admissible at normal sentencing 
hearings, will be unreliable and inadmissible during penalty phase of capital trial). 
Hearsay statements from an unavailable third party that inculpate an accused are 
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presumed unreliable. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004); Lily v. Virginia, 527 
U.S. 116, 119 S.Ct 1887 (1999); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) overruled by 
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. at 66-69; State v. Villarreal, 889 P.2d 419 (Utah 
1995). In the guilt phase of a criminal case, those statements are never admissible 
because an accused cannot confront or cross-examine the witness. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 
66 (hearsay inadmissible unless defendant was given prior opportunity to cross-examine); 
Lily, 119 S. Ct. at 1898 (when one person accuses another of a crime under circumstances 
where the declarant stands to benefit then the statement is suspect); Lee v. Illinois, 476 
U.S. 530, 541 (1986)("because the co-defendant/declarant may gain by inculpating 
another, the accusation is presumptively suspect and must be subjected to the scrutiny of 
cross-examination."); Villarreal, 889 P.2d at 424 ("It is fundamental that to ensure 
accuracy and reliability, testimony should be given under oath in open court with the 
opportunity for cross-examination."). 
Because the heightened standard of reliability attached to penalty phase evidence, 
hearsay statements like Manley5 s should never be admissible in a penalty phase hearing. 
That statement was inherently unreliable, first, because when given, Manley was 
suspected as an accomplice. See Lily, 119 S.Ct. at 1898 (accomplice confessions 
ordinarily are untrustworthy precisely because they are not unambiguously adverse to the 
penal interest of the declarant but instead are likely to be attempts to minimize the 
declarant's culpability). Parole agent Cathy Truelson reported that Manley was involved 
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with Mr. Taylor and may have provided the gun used in the homicide. Moreover, even if 
Manley wasn't a formal suspect he still had a powerful motive to curry favor with 
authorities in the hope of favorable treatment on his pending parole violation. Davis v. 
Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974)(partiality of a witness is subject to exploration at trial and is 
always relevant as discrediting witness and affecting weight of his testimony). 
Both trial counsel and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to raise this 
issue on appeal. If the issue had been raised on appeal, Mr. Taylor would have prevailed 
on that claim since it was clear error to admit Manley5s hearsay statement and the 
statement was prejudicial. This statement was effectively and repeatedly used by the 
prosecutor to argue for death.36 The statement was admitted despite its unreliability. 
Moreover, trial counsel was never given the opportunity to cross-examine Manley or 
introduce impeachment and bias evidence. The admission of this evidence alone is 
36
 The prejudice of this statement is evident from the prosecution's closing 
argument. The prosecution, in arguing for death, called the Manley tape "the most 
significant thing [they] heard . . . " on May 21, 1991, the day in which several police 
officers and Rolf Tiede testified. TrialTr. 831-32. He quoted extensively from the 
Manley transcript calling it a "premeditated murder," and that Mr. Taylor "was waiting to 
kill the Tiede Family." Vol. V, TR. 831-32. In arguing that there were no physical or 
mental problems with Mr. Taylor he again cited the Manley tape: 
It isn't a situation where he made a decision instantaneously. This is a situation, 
ladies and gentlemen, where he knew he was going to kill these people for at least 
three hours based upon the telephone call to Mr. Manley and probably a lot longer 
than that. So I would submit there's nothing wrong with his mental or physical 
condition. 
Vol. IV, TR. 840. 
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siiHVinit i«» undermine confidence in the jurv's verdict for death. It Is also unfair ly 
prejudicial when considered with the other errors identified in the petition and discussed 
in this memorandum. 
IX. THE PROSECUTORS COMMITTED MISCONDUCT BY 
INTRODUCING PREJUDICIAL EVIDENCE, MAKING IMPROPER 
ARGUMENT AND MISREPRESENTING THE BURDEN OF PROOF FOR 
4GGRAVATTNG CIRCUMSTANCES 
. A prosecutor is prohibits ' K .= < < J iscussing inadmissible evidence and may not -. 
determining its verdict." State v. Lafferh\ 20 P.3d 342, 368 (Utah 2001); State ,. kui, ol 
P.3d 1019, 1033 (Utah 2002); State v. Saunders, 992 P.2d 051 (Utah 1999). The Utah 
Supreme Court hr»s quoted the oft-repeated standard diluting prosecution conduct in a 
V p i U b C C U u n g a i U M H C J 1> LUC l C p l c S ^ i -
controversy, but of a sovereignty whu^: .;t,i:^.. . .., ^v;^:.. ;nij^iuuli} .. d>, 
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and w hose interest, therefore, in a 
criminal prosecution is not \i\ai it shall win a case, hut that justice shall be done 
As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law. the two-
fold aim of which is that guilty shall not escape nor the innocent suffer. He may 
prosecute with earnest and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But, while he ma\ 
-irike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty n i 
jetrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful >vvn C^t;,-m > 
v> use cvc<~\ legitimate menus to brine aboi it a u ist one. 
Saunders, hi . ^unions onitULd). 
In this case, trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to any of the 
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prejudicial evidence introduced in this case. Appellate counsel also failed to raise any of 
the issues identified below. To prevail on this claim, Mr. Taylor must show that the 
failure to raise these claims was due to ineffective assistance of counsel. Moreover, a 
petitioner must show that "absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable outcome for the defendant. Lafferty, at 368; see Gardner v. Holden, 888, P.2d 
608, 613 (Utah 1994).(to prevail on a claim in post-conviction, a petitioner must show the 
existence of fundamental unfairness). 
The prosecution misconduct and overreaching began in voir dire. Every time trial 
counsel asked jurors in voir dire to compare a life sentence with the death penalty, the 
prosecution objected. Trial TR.153. No jurors were asked about the comparative 
seriousness of a life sentence versus the death penalty, because the prosecution objected. 
Trial TR. 153. The prosecution also objected to questions about the verdict in the Deli 
case, which received extensive press coverage after jurors convicted him of non-capital 
offenses. Trial TR. 210. This conduct had a chilling effect on trial counsel's voir dire 
questions, as he asked very few voir dire questions after the initial objection. 
During the penalty phase, the prosecution called Medical Examiner Investigator 
James Bell. Trial TR. 550. Bell conducted a portion of the investigation and gathered 
some of the evidence. Id. 552-73. In May, 1991, just before the penalty phase, Bell 
accepted a job with the FBI Serial Killer Task Force. Trial TR. 552. Near the end of the 
direct examination, the prosecution improperly asked Bell to rate this homicide using a 
98 
' I"1!! "grossn^ss'1 wi le 
Q. [ by the prosecuLui j . • -..i. \ w indicated that you've basically done hundreds of 
these crime scene investigations involving shootings, Mr. Levine has indicated that 
all shootings are gross. On a scale of one to 10, could you characterize how gross 
this shooting was? 
Tobahh a nine, 
hv ti,>you say thai"' 
>oeauvj \\\ a ^iraiic^Mo siranL:- 1 ' • " 
.. mi sees it com i ng a] I. the time. 
The prosecutor used this improper evidence forcefi ill;> ai id repeatedly d;t n ing 
liicii this murder is a nine on a scale often, Trial TR, 835, improperly promoted Bell's 
credentials as serial killer im estimator in asking the jury to e\ aluatc or compare the 
"grossneso . . ... , .V .LJ . vwiUuvia,, \ \. .i.. , . , . I 
execution murder." Id. See State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483 (Utah 1984)(comparing 
defendant to other criminals is improper and constitutes prosecutor misconduct). 
The prosecution committed additional misconduct by improperly referring to the 
Mamey tape to argue that the killings were "premeditated,' that I aylor and Deli '' < \ ere 
J'r. ^30-31. See Argument Regarding Manley Tape Above; Cargle, 317 F.3d 1196 
(prosecutor misconduct, combined with failure to present mitigation results in reversal of 
ucath sentence), [his was equally egregious and improper, but was effectively used to 
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argue for death. Both the admissibility of the tape and the argument based on the tape 
were improper and prejudicial. 
The prosecutor committed additional misconduct in closing argument by 
suggesting that a death sentence was the only appropriate option because Mr. Taylor 
might escape from prison. TR. 855. There was no evidence presented at the penalty 
phase hearing that Mr. Taylor had escaped from prison, that he attempted escape from 
prison, or that he would be housed in a section of the prison where escape was likely. 
The prejudice of that argument was exacerbated by the court's refusal to allow trial 
counsel to voir dire jurors about a comparative analysis between life in prison and the 
death penalty and by the failure to give the life imprison jury instruction. The prosecution 
improperly suggested that because Mr. Taylor left a half-way house, he might therefore 
escape from prison, leaving the jury only one alternative: the death penalty. 
Both during the initial portion of closing argument and again during rebuttal, the 
prosecution improperly told the jury that they did not have to find him guilty of the other 
offenses to consider those offenses as aggravating circumstances. In the first part of 
closing, although the prosecutor told the jury that they must find aggravating 
circumstances beyond a doubt, he nonetheless tells the jury: "it's not your job to say he's 
guilty or not guilty of those crimes, it's only your job to consider whether or not they 
should be used as aggravating circumstances." Trial Tr. 839-40. This had the effect of 
misrepresenting or reducing the burden of proof to establish those aggravating 
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circi ii nsta nces A\ gain on c nrosecuiion contused the burden of proof regarding 
aggravating circumstances: • • 
Now you don't have to find that each and everyone of these [other crimes] have 
been proven to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt to impose the penalty 
of death. There are a number of them, some eight or nine. And I think when you 
look at it you'll come to the conclusion that the state has proven each and every 
one of those crimes and their aggravating factors. But you don't have to find them 
m order to come to the determination that the appropriate penalty is death. Yoii 
an find that simply from the aggravated circumstances of the killing itself. 
j
 / ol. , I R ,8 72 ; 3(emphasL^uu;.. 
The repeated misconduct identified abi 
; *- . i I : ; r - . . • v -; J : • ., J . ; - , r t ;> ' '• , i _ . \\\ a v a i l . 1 - I'< ' ' ^ ' I V r S , 
nr~ -1, ^crc-.Med that death was appropriate because Mr. Taylor might escape, 
wrongly used the Manley statement to argue premeditation, and unfairly appealed to 
passions of the jury by suggesting that Mi. la vior was worse than a senai kiiler mki 
inflammatory rhetoric, designed to sway the passions of jurors to vote for death. The 
prosecution not only misrepresented the standard for finding aggravating circumstances, 
but then vigorously and forcefully used inadmissible evidence to argue for death. 
In the absence of this misconduct, Mr. Taylor would have received a sentence less 
affected the process to such an extent as to render Mr. Tavlor's death sentence 
fundamentally unfair and unconstitutional. A bsent these errors, "there is a reasonable 
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likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the [Mr. Taylor]." This court should 
accordingly review these claims under the unusual circumstances test. 
X. BOTH TRIAL AND APPELLATE COUNSEL PROVIDED 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
The Post-Conviction Remedies Act and unusual circumstance test outlined in 
Carter III, recognize claims of ineffective assistance as a means of defeating the 
procedural bar that the arguments could have been raised on appeal, but were not. See 
Carter III, 44 P.3d at 634. To the extent that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 
were not adequately expressed in the arguments above, petitioner reasserts that both trial 
and appellate counsel were ineffective in their representation of Mr. Taylor for the 
reasons stated above. 
XI. MR. TAYLOR'S DEATH SENTENCE IS INVALID BECAUSE THE 
CAPITAL MURDER AND SENTENCING STATUTE ARE 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS AND 
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES OF THE UNITED STATES AND UTAH 
CONSTITUTIONS 
In 1990, the Utah death penalty statute had sixteen aggravating circumstances. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (1990). That statute along with the sentencing statute found 
in Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207 (1990), fails to narrow the category of persons eligible for 
the death penalty. This argument was first considered and addressed in State v. Young, 
853 P.2d 327, 396-410 (Durham, J, dissenting). Justice Durham explained that in order to 
pass constitutional muster, a death penalty statute must narrow the pool of death eligible 
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II -is i i imerically ,. r.< .--^ ' •• ; -^ in " :iie death eligible murders from non-capital , 
murders by articulating a good reason to characterize certain murders as death eligible. Id 
at 398-99. The Utah scheme fails by having so many broad categories that \ irtuaii> .m 
intentional murdei s can be death penalty cases ! "d. ' . -: 
I lie Uiah aipual ^emciicmy pioecss pcinnls (he iiiipusilitiii nf lln; dctiiii pen.ifh, mi 
: - ' : - . • M. mpanied by an aggravating circumstance. Moreover; 
the sentencing statute sets no rational boundaries or limits on the introduction of 
aggravating factors. Nor does the statute limit the extent or scope of aggravating factors. 
in; mconstiti ltional \: ' : • .-,••. '.''": •'• .."•" • '-. ,;.. ':• • '•• • . • '••'. : ' • • , v •' •'••' " . .' • ' .'•'•••' 
there has been no meaningful appellate review of most issues raised in this petition. >. _ 
one has reviewed the legality of jury instructions, the voir dire errors, jury impartiality 
problems, introduction of prejudicial erroi and prosecutoi misconduct, and R ule 11 
the plea and sentencing demonstrates a fundamental unfairness and failure to adequately 
narrow the category of persons eligible for death. Mr. Taylor has had no meaningful 
rev ie \ of any clain is i ip to this point in tl le pi ocess. 
"N either I ,evine nor Savage raised this claim. In fact, I e\ ine filed no preti ial 
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accordingly declare the statute unconstitutional on its face and as applied to this case. 
XII. MR. TAYLOR'S DEATH SENTENCE IS INVALID UNDER THE 
STATE AND FEDERAL GUARANTEES OF DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL 
PROTECTION, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL, AND A RELIABLE 
SENTENCE BECAUSE OF LEVINE'S CONFLICT OF INTEREST. 
In 1996, Levine was suspending from practicing law for three years, as a result of 
his simultaneous representation of James Holland and Von Lester Taylor. Post-
Conviction R. 790. Levine's conduct with regard to James Holland in this case is 
described above. Levine called Holland as a witness. As a result of the conduct, the Utah 
Supreme Court disqualified Levine from both the Holland and Taylor cases, suspended 
him from the practice of law, and reversed Holland's death sentence. State v. Holland, 
876 P.2d 357 (Utah 1994). In light of the additional evidence discovered in the post-
conviction record and the issues that were neither raised nor addressed by the this Court, 
Mr. Taylor asks this Court to reconsider the conflict of interest claims pursuant to the 
unusual circumstance test. 
XIII. MR. TAYLOR'S DEATH SENTENCE IS INVALID UNDER THE 
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES OF DUE 
PROCESS, EQUAL PROTECTION. AND A RELIABLE SENTENCE 
BECAUSE IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IS CRUEL AND 
UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT. 
The Eighth Amendment prohibits punishment which is inconsistent with the 
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of an ordered society. See Roper v. 
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1
 ;M/ " ' "O'^KFighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the 
execution of persons under the age of eighteen); Adkins i \ Virginia, 536 I J.S. 304 
'^^Ycxceution of mentally retarded persons constitutes cruel and unusual punishment). 
. .. > it 
willi unnecessary "vmr has been interpreted similarly and perhaps provides greater 
protection than ii- federal counterpart. 
The trend current!}' :n uu. world is toward abolition of the death penal r\. Virtually 
e v e r / W e s t e r n European country has abolished the death penalty, i nde^ i . mos; wi those 
coi inti ies \ v ill not exti adite I Jnited Stat; • ; • .: ;rs if the :l : ath penalty is possir i 
199G, the United Nations called on all member nations to abolish the death pena^v . Uu/ 
\ '^iibors to north and south, Canada and Mexico, have both abolished the death penalty. 
Germany and South Africa, two nations with z history ox violent insurrection aik; 
of constitutional provisions. Many other third world nations have out lawed the death 
penalty on moral , legal, and ethical grounds. The Utah government ' s state-sanctioned 
killing is inconsistent with this modem, trend jnd o\ i>i\ uu; auiiuiaias oi uecuicy that mark 
a:i i :>i dered and m a t u r i n g socie ty . .:.. . .'•'.;• .' .;. -. •' 
analogical interest ! »ui's case. The gross errors committed in this case, the 
^:iiu_ to perform or conduct investigation, the existence of mental health issues that 
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should have been discovered, the legal errors in the instructions, the improper plea 
colloquy, and other legal errors, the misconduct committed by the prosecution, and all the 
other facts and claims identified above, make the imposition of the death penalty cruel 
and unusual punishment and treatment with unnecessary rigor. 
The death penalty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and treatment with 
unnecessary rigor under any and all circumstances, and constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment and treatment with unnecessary rigor in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Taylor asks this Court to reverse Mr. Taylor's conviction and remand the 
matter to the trial court for a new trial. Alternatively, Mr. Taylor asks this Court to 
reverse Mr. Taylor's death sentence and remand the matter for a new sentencing phase 
hearing. 
DATED this 2B. day of June, 2005 
RICHARD P. MAURO 
Attorney For Von Lester Taylor 
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